

CIVIL MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS PROGRAM: A SPECIAL
OPERATIONS SOLUTION TO THREATS DERIVED
FROM UNDERGOVERNED AREAS

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Art of War Scholars

by

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ABSTRACT

CIVIL MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS PROGRAM: A SPECIAL OPERATIONS SOLUTION TO THREATS DERIVED FROM UNDERGOVERNED AREAS, by MAJ Christian A. Carr, 132 pages.

Arguably the most serious threats to United States (U.S.) national security, in both the current and future operating environments are terrorist or criminal non-state organizations. The *2015 National Security Strategy*, *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*, and *Army Operating Concept 2020-2040* clearly identifies these threats as the most complex problem that the U.S. Army will face. In 2014, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) requested further research to identify ways that Special Operations Forces (SOF) may effectively accomplish their objectives in undergoverned, threat areas. Using three regionally diverse examples, this thesis proposes that the Civil Military Engagements (CME) program, within the Civil Affairs (CA) Regiment, provides SOF an optimal solution to achieve its long-term objectives in undergoverned areas. This is initially due to their ability to gain and maintain access into targeted regions, and capitalizing on this access by filling information gaps and identifying sources of instability. However, the greatest value is its ability to serve as a vanguard for Department of State (DoS) efforts in assisting host nation governance.

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ACRONYMS

AFRICOM	Africa Command
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
CA	Civil Affairs
CAF	Conflict Assessment Framework
CAQC	CA Qualification Course
CIM	Civil Information Management
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
CMAG	Civil Military Advisory Group
CME	Civil Military Engagements
CMSE	Civil-Military Support Element
CR	Civil Reconnaissance
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FOE	Future Operating Environment
GAO	Governmental Accountability Office
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commander
HoA	Horn of Africa
IA	Interagency
IMSG	Institute for Military Support to Governance
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MSRP	Mission Strategic Resource Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
PMT	Pre-Mission Training
SOCFWD	Special Operations Command Forward
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOC PAC	Special Operations Command Pacific
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
U.S.	United States
UAP	Unified Action Partners
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USG	United States Government
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Insurgents, transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, nation states and their proxies exploit gaps in policy developed for the more predictable world of yesterday. The direct approach alone is not the solution to the challenges our Nation faces today as it ultimately only buys time and space for the indirect approach and broader governmental elements to take effect. Less well known but decisive in importance, the indirect approach is the element that can counter the systemic components of the threat.

— Admiral (Ret) William H. McRaven,
Posture Statement to Congress 2013

Arguably, the most critical crisis facing the United States (U.S.) today is the insurgent organization; Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Their aggressive tactics and grand objectives threaten the existing governments in the Middle East, the legitimacy of U.S. efforts in Iraq, and global security. After 10 years of U.S. and foreign power involvement in Iraq, how did this threat grow so rapidly? ISIS grew as a result of ineffective, negligent, and often brutal governance in Syria. It spread to Iraq because of the ineffective and sectarian Iraqi Government that manifested itself after the U.S. withdrawal.¹ Despite the magnitude of the threat posed by ISIS, they are just one of the many non-state terrorist and criminal organizations that challenge and perplex U.S. and Department of Defense (DoD) policy makers. Organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah in

¹ Ali Kherdy, “How ISIS Came to Be,” *The Guardian*, 22 August 2014, accessed 12 September 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/22/syria-iraq-incubators-isis-jihad>.

Indonesia, or the National Liberation Army in Sri Lanka challenge U.S. interests because of their ability to project power transnationally and their lack of political restrictions.²

These threats to U.S. interests exist because they are able to exploit vulnerabilities within their respective societies, caused by their government's inability to maintain legitimacy throughout the country. This is not always due to a lack of military or security forces. More often, this is due to an increase in governance infrastructure that is not state sponsored. In cases such as Sri Lanka, the government has a robust presence throughout its territory. However, the Government of Sri Lanka lacks legitimacy in much of the country. As a result, non-state actors have developed an informal infrastructure that is legitimate in the eyes of the populace and competes with the established government.³ This phenomenon is one of the key contributors to the creation of undergoverned territories.

Historically, the U.S. emphasizes security cooperation and military assistance when dealing with the security problems that undergoverned territories generate. It is also a fact that many undergoverned areas are not secure and require a military presence for security.⁴ Therefore, would it not be more effective if the DoD emphasized governance along with security in order to combat these non-state actors? The Department of State

² Headquarters, United State Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040* (Ft Eustis, VA: Government Printing Office, 2014).

³ Ahmed S. Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

⁴ Angel Rabasa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Theodore W. Karasik, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kevin A. O'Brien, and John E. Peters, *Undergoverned Territories: Understanding and Mitigating Terrorism Risks* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007).

(DoS) has the lead in most of these undergoverned environments, but the environment is often unsafe and not permissive enough for DoS employees. Therefore, a DoD service member who operates in non-permissive environments, but is educated enough to advance DoS objectives, can be a powerful tool in the Future Operating Environment (FOE).

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) describes the FOE as one highlighted by individual empowerment and a diffusion of power. The NIC estimates that there are approximately 50 countries in that stage between autocracy and democracy; the most volatile stage of a maturing nation.⁵ In this stage, small groups of diverse state and non-state actors challenge the established governments to maintain their legitimacy and influence over all the groups within their state. The 2015 *National Security Strategy* (NSS) also addresses the dangers that the FOE will present to U.S interests. The NSS recognizes that failing states breed conflict and endanger regional and global security sets about to help states avoid becoming terrorist safe havens, by helping them build their capacity for responsible governance and security, through development and security sector assistance.⁶

In support of the NSS objectives, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) developed several programs to prevent the emergence of conflict.⁷ The former Commander of U.S.

⁵ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030 Alternative Worlds* (Washington, DC: NIC, 2012), vi-ix.

⁶ The President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), 16, 21, accessed 10 February 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.

⁷ Linda Robinson, *The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, DC: Council of Foreign Relations, 2013).

Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Admiral (Ret) William McRaven identified challenges the future environment presents and is committed to addressing the threat with persistent engagement. SOF are currently deployed in 74 countries, in addition to Iraq and Afghanistan. They are not actively involved in combat, or in fighting against a traditional opposing military force. They offer a small-footprint approach to achieve U.S. National objectives and mitigate threats to the U.S. This includes denying/disrupting safe havens, severing connectivity between extremist nodes, challenging violent ideology, offering alternatives to potential recruits and maintaining the world's premier capability to conduct global, full-spectrum direct action. However, despite recognizing this challenge, the question remains; in regions lacking a viable national government, how can SOF identify and deny access to safe havens in undergoverned territories?

In a similar fashion, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) also recognized the challenges of the FOE, in which traditional boundaries are less important and violent organizations operate out of safe havens. While historically SOF leaders have effectively utilized their strike capabilities to remove insurgent leadership, future threats are proving more resilient. The Army of the future must address these threats by removing the root of the instability. Future SOF strategy directs global special warfare campaigns through Unified Action and its partners, which to deter and defeat adversaries and to build partner capabilities for national objectives.⁸

Most of today's SOF engagements take place in phase zero environments. Joint and multinational doctrine defines phase zero as; various military and interagency

⁸ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, "ARSOF 2022 Operating Concept," U.S. Special Operations Command, 2014, accessed 13 December 2014, <http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF%20Operating%20Concept%202014.pdf>.

activities performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. Phase zero operations will be discussed further during the literature review section of this thesis. During phase zero, the operating environment is commonly referred to as a Title 22 zone. Title 22 zones are regions in which the DoS and the U.S. Ambassador assumes the lead for promoting U.S. interests, and the DoD is the supporting organization.

Strategically, the U.S. seeks to utilize diplomatic, development, and defense policies to promote relationships that are mutually beneficial for the U.S. and our partner nations. The goal of SOF in Title 22 zones is to offer combatant commanders, ambassadors, and host nations a tool to meet their security, diplomatic, or political challenges.⁹ A common term for this SOF contribution is Special Operations Power. While there are several variations for the definition of Special Operations Power, they all converge on utilizing the spectrum of Special Operations capabilities and in applying them to influence, coerce, compel, and impose will on competitors.¹⁰

The Problem

In 2014, the Joint Special Operations University proposed a list of priority research topics. These topics are in support of the USSOCOM Commander's lines of operations. Priority topic A2 identifies the threats which arise from undergoverned

⁹ Admiral William McRaven, Commander USSOCOM, Posture Statement before 113th Congress House Armed Service Committee, 6 March 2013, accessed 17 July 2014, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130306/100394/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-McRavenUSNA-20130306.pdf>.

¹⁰ Brian S. Petit, *Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero* (Denver, CO: Outskirts Press, 2013).

regions, and asks what role SOF should have in those areas.¹¹ Both the *Quadrennial Defense Review* and USSOCOM's strategic guidance, highlight building partner capacity and increasing the host nations legitimacy as the essential line of effort. This effort is challenging and demands a careful synchronization of DoD and DoS objectives. The effort is further challenged by a lack of specific guidance on operating in undergoverned areas.

After identifying the problem posed by undergoverned territories, and understanding the demands required in phase zero operations, Admiral (Ret) McRaven, presented Congress with a potential solution. He described a SOF force that could focus on preventing the emergence of conflict. "Through Civil-Military Support Elements (CMSE) and support to public diplomacy, SOF directly support interagency efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of violence that Al-Qaida and other terrorists exploit."¹² Admiral (Ret) McRaven goes on to describe CMSE efforts that help prevent terrorist radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization. CMSE efforts are persistent and differ from traditional military campaigns by proactively identifying and mitigating insurgent ideology. Over the long run, these proactive activities reduce strategic risk, protect American lives, and reduce the need for expensive responses to terrorist attacks. Therefore, the Civil Affairs (CA) CMSE program can be a valuable way of accomplishing SOF objectives in a Title 22 environment. Chapter 2 of this thesis will

¹¹ Joint Special Operations University, *Special Operations Research Topics 2014* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2014).

¹² McRaven.

further describe the CMSE and Civil Military Engagements (CME) program. Was ADM (Ret) McRaven correct in his “troops to task analysis?”

Civil Affairs is a component of Army SOF, and is specifically tasked by Title 10 to:

1. Enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present;
2. Coordinate with other interagency, intergovernmental and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), indigenous populations and institutions and the private sector; and
3. Apply the functional specialty skills that normally would be the responsibility of civil government, to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.

With this congressional direction, CA forces have the license to be a primary role player during phase zero, one and five of Joint Operations.¹³

Civil Affairs Soldiers are culturally trained; specifically, they receive education in language, cultural analysis, vulnerability assessments, mediations, and Interagency (IA) collaboration. Where a typical soldier focuses on defeating an enemy, CA Soldiers train and focus on identifying and mitigating sources of instability. This training allows CA to be much more palatable to a U.S. Ambassador because it provides a solution that is not traditional. CA units also have female soldiers assigned at every level, allowing them access to a much greater portion of society than a traditional all male Special Forces unit.

When the NSS seeks to apply the skills of our military, diplomats, and development

¹³ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “ARSOF 2022,” U.S. Special Operations Command, 2013, 10, accessed 24 August 2014, http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF2022_vFINAL.pdf.

experts in order to prevent the emergence of conflict, the Army has already equipped CA Soldiers to bridge all three domains through human interaction.

Civil Affairs does not have to confine its activities to permissive or semi-permissive areas. CA Soldiers receive survivability and force protection training that is equivalent or similar to Special Forces Soldiers. Each member of a CA team, deployed on a CMSE, goes through a full Pre-Mission training (PMT) that includes Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, Force Protection, Counter-Surveillance as well as other regionally specific training. Each team has an organic medic allowing them to survive in hostile or denied areas for short periods of time.

Theoretically, CA appears to be an organizational solution to achieve SOF and national objectives in undergoverned regions. This is because of their Title 10 directive to synchronize SOF and DoS activities. Doctrinally, the CA Regiment's core tasks of Civil Reconnaissance (CR), Civil Information Management (CIM), and Support to Civic Administration allow them to become the solution for a force that requires a diplomatic soldier, capable of operating in a politically sensitive environment with a small-footprint. SOF' Senior Commanders have suggested that CA can be the solution to the threats found in undergoverned areas.¹⁴

Since 2006, CA Soldiers have conducted operations in over 20 countries that can be categorized as either undergoverned or containing regions that lack central governance.¹⁵ This thesis examines the CA missions in the undergoverned areas of the Horn of Africa (HoA), Sri Lanka, and Pakistan and evaluates how CA units have

¹⁴ McRaven.

¹⁵ Ibid.

historically achieved SOF objectives, and expanded both the SOF and DoS mission in undergoverned areas. Using these examples, this thesis proposes that the CA Regiment is the solution to both analyze and counter the threats created by undergoverned areas. Their ability to use basic humanitarian services as a means to gain entry into those areas is a proven method to access vulnerable populations worldwide. The CA capability to conduct CR and CIM enhances the civil understanding and analysis of the terrorist organizations. Finally, the ability to serve as a vanguard for DoS support to host nation governance allows CA to directly impact SOF' long-term objectives. In support of this proposal, this thesis identifies four organizational and capability gaps that negatively influenced the accomplishment of SOF objectives and provides recommended solutions to those gaps.

Assumptions

Debate currently exists within the SOF community about whether short-term, surgical strikes or long-term, capacity building is the ideal method of countering terrorism and violent extremist threats in undergoverned areas. McRaven proposed that the surgical strike should be used to shape the environment for capacity building. He affirmed that long-term, capacity building is the only method to eradicate the threats, which reside in undergoverned territories.¹⁶ The *NSS* supports this assertion through its strategic guidance.¹⁷ This thesis recognizes this guidance and assumes that capacity

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ The President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), accessed 12 December 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

building is the most effective way to mitigate the sources of instability that lead to Violent Extremist Organization (VEO) activity. Therefore this thesis will focus on discovering if CA is an optimal solution to support this guidance in undergoverned regions.

Limitations

The CME program was developed in 2006 and codified as a program of record in 2008.¹⁸ As a result, the relatively short history limits the data outlining CA activities in support of SOF objectives in undergoverned territories. The Sri Lanka vignette outlined in this thesis demonstrates this lack of data. In 2009, SOF did not have any presence in Sri Lanka. The CMSE Team Leader, deployed to Sri Lanka in 2009 was the first SOF soldier permitted to work in that targeted region and his actions helped spearhead SOF in that country. Any data on CA activities in Sri Lanka from 2009 to 2010 is limited to the actions performed by the CMSE Team Leader. However, it maintains value because of the significance of the deployment.

In 2013, Lieutenant General (LTG) Charles Cleveland, the USASOC published his guidance for Army SOF. This guidance, captured in Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) 2022, further clarified the role that CA will play when working with DoS. As a result, USASOC developed the Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG) and Civil Military Advisory Group (CMAG). While both of these organizations are making tremendous strides in closing the SOF-DoS gap, limited data exists on their activities to date. Each organization has only had one department head, and much of their mission is

¹⁸ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Directive 525-38, *Civil Military Engagement* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: USSOCOM, November 2012).

theoretical at this point. Any data collected on these organizations will be from the activities conducted in the past year.

Delimitations

The problem and research topic was proposed by the Joint Special Operations University, in support of the USSOCOM Commander's Lines of Operations. As a result, this thesis highlights the efforts of CA in support of SOF objectives. All active duty CA Soldiers are SOF Soldiers, and share SOF as their proponent. However, CA Soldiers are also assigned to the 85th CA Brigade, and support both U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) objectives. Given the vision found in Army Operating Concept 2020-2040, FORSCOM may benefit greatly from adopting the CME program in all of the GCCs. However, the research conducted in support of this thesis was in response to the USSOCOM research question and focused on CA support to SOF objectives alone.

Conclusion

The researcher recognizes that the optimal conduct of Special Warfare requires a synchronization of SOF power. Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and CA must all work in an integrated effort to achieve SOF objectives. However, each component brings something unique to achieve those objectives. This thesis highlights the CA contribution to the larger SOF campaign. SOF guidance states that CA activities are a critical component of the indirect approach, to achieving the SOF approaches. However, the fact that USSOCOM requested research support on how to mitigate the threats from

undergoverned areas highlights that SOF remains unclear how to systematically and effectively achieve long-term objectives in those areas.

This thesis proposes that the CA Regiment is the optimal means by which SOF may achieve its long-term objectives with regards to terrorist organizations in undergoverned areas. Their doctrinal mission, core tasks, and Title 10 directive support this proposal. The next chapter will review the literature on this topic and provide an assessment of the significance of that material to this study. Chapter 3 provides an explanation of the methodology while chapter 4 examines the primary and secondary research questions, through the lens of three regionally diverse CA missions. Finally, chapter 5 concludes by outlining the specific capabilities that make CA the answer to the undergoverned territory problem. It then provides recommendations to enhance the effectiveness for future CA Soldiers.

Definitions

Army doctrine provides the definitions for organizations and capabilities; this will ensure objectivity and eliminate “unit” definitions that unit standard operating procedures create. This includes CA Operations, Special Operations CA, Functional Specialists, and Special Operations. As emerging capabilities ARSOF 2022, the guidance document for Army SOF, will provide the definitions for the IMMSG and CMAG.

Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF): (From Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-05) Army SOF are those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support Special Operations. The acronym ARSOF represents

CA, Military Information Support Operations, Rangers, Special Forces, Special Mission Units, and Army Special Operations Aviation Forces assigned to the USASOC.¹⁹

Civil Affairs Functional Specialists: USAR CA force structure contains expertise in six functional specialty areas; (1) rule of law, (2) economic stability, (3) governance, (4) public health and welfare, (5) infrastructure, and (6) public education and information. Within each functional specialty area, technically qualified and experienced individuals, known as CA Functional Specialists, advise and assist the commander and can assist or direct their civilian counterparts. Within their area of specialization, they possess the critical skills necessary to establish that capability and understand the regional and local impact of culture on that capability. The allocation of functional specialty areas and Functional Specialists varies between unit levels as well as between units of the same level in the Regular Army and USAR. This was done by design to account for the operational need for these specialties at each level, as well as for the ability of each component to maintain the high-level skills necessary for specialized Civil Affairs Operations. Commanders may employ these Functional Specialists (especially at the operational and strategic levels) for general support of interagency operations, in addition to direct support of military operations. When civilian expertise, normally provided by United States Government (USG) agencies is not available, CA Functional Specialists may be required to fill key planning, operational, or liaison roles until replaced by their government counterparts.²⁰

¹⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), iv.

²⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *CA Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 1-8.

Civil Affairs Operations: (From Field Manual 3-57) Civil Affairs Operations are conducted by the designated Regular Army and USAR CA forces organized, trained, and equipped to provide specialized support to commanders. Civil Affairs Operations are conducted to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities (government and nongovernment) and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile Area of Operations to facilitate military operations and to consolidate operational objectives. CA forces may assist in the performance of activities and functions by military forces that are normally the responsibility of local government. Civil Affairs Operations may occur before or during military operations, as well as during post hostility operations. CA establish and maintain the relationship between security forces, interagency entities, NGOs, intergovernmental and international organizations, civil authorities, and indigenous populations and institutions to prevent friction and achieve unity of effort. In limited instances, they also involve the application of CA functional specialty skills, by USAR CA forces, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, which enhance the conduct of Civil Affairs Operations.²¹

Civil Military Advisory Group (CMAG): CMAG is an operationalized concept that provides ARSOF the capability to share information, collaborate with and leverage the resources and capabilities of a network of Unified Action Partners (UAP) in order to provide reach-back support to ground combatant commanders and ARSOF commanders. At its core, the CMAG serves to build and sustain the readiness of standing partnerships and a community of action. This network of UAPs includes non-military, interagency, academia, think tanks, corporate entities, international and NGOs and other non-military

²¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 3-05, *Special Operations*, 2-7.

forces that directly aid in successful completion of missions in special warfare campaigns.²²

Civil Military Engagements (CME): CME is a USSOCOM program of record. Funded through Major Force Program (MFP)-11, the CME program is SOF CA executed capability which provides an indirect line-of-operation capability through persistent civil-military engagement, in specific countries and regions, to shape the civil dimension of the operational environment. The 95th CA Brigade is the only unit with the authority to train, equip, deploy, and conduct Civil Affairs Operations under the USSOCOM CME program. The 85th CA BDE has executed limited CME type missions in support of GCC objectives and funded through MFP-2.²³

Department of State (DoS): The Department of State's mission is to shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and democratic world and foster conditions for stability and progress, for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere. This mission is shared with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), ensuring we have a common path forward in partnership, as we invest in the shared security and prosperity that will ultimately better prepare us for the challenges of tomorrow.²⁴ As the proponent of each U.S. Embassies mission, DoS maintains oversight

²² U.S. Army Special Operations Command, "ARSOF 2022 Part II," U.S. Special Operations Command, 2014, 7, accessed 13 December 2014, <http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF%202022%20Part%202.PDF>.

²³ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Directive 525-38, *Civil Military Engagement*.

²⁴ Department of State, *FY 2014 Agency Fiscal Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, November 2014), accessed 29 November 2014, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/2014/>.

of IA, and NGOs. For the purpose of this thesis, the term DoS will be used as an umbrella term for USAID, IA, and NGOs unless specifically identified as separate.

Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG): The IMSG is an effort within the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School that will manage the provision of civil sector expertise across the range of military operations, to support USG obligations under international law and to promote stability. The IMSG will also support the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), transitional military authorities and support to civil-administration operations as appropriate. Instrumental to the IMSG is the Civil Sector Expert Program, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 38G, which will enable the U.S. Army to leverage operational practitioners for critical civilian sector skill sets.²⁵ This program will allow CA generalists to rapidly provide civil sector expertise in undergoverned territories, in order to mitigate vulnerabilities.

Special Operations Civil Affairs: All active duty CA forces are considered Special Operations CA forces. These Soldiers are members of the 85th CA Brigade, a FORSCOM aligned organization, and the 95th CA Brigade which is aligned with USASOC. Active duty CA Soldiers are specially selected, trained, and organized to operate independently or as part of a larger Special Operations element within austere, politically sensitive, hostile, or denied AOs. At the tactical level, Special Operations CA teams operate with and through host nation or indigenous partners and focus on gaining and maintaining access to key areas and populations to understand, identify, and address civil conditions being exploited or at risk of being exploited by adversaries. From the tactical to strategic level, Special Operations CA elements plan, coordinate, enable, and

²⁵ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “ARSO 2022 Part II,” 7.

execute operations, activities, and tasks to achieve specified USG objectives. Special Operations CA elements liaise, coordinate, and synchronize efforts with appropriate USG, host nation, intergovernmental, non-governmental, and international organizations to leverage all available resources and ensure unity of effort. Special Operations CA elements increase USG situational awareness and understanding of key areas and relevant populations and enable future operations planning through CIM.²⁶

Special Warfare: In 2012, SOF doctrine first defined the term Special Warfare. Special Warfare is one of the two critical capabilities that SOF delivers to the nation. Special Forces, Psychological Operations, and CA execute Special Warfare activities, which include unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counter-insurgency, stability operations, special reconnaissance, and security force assistance. Special Warfare is the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment. Special Warfare activities involve the ability to operate within the population—specifically, to address sociocultural factors by understanding the culture of the population. Army operations must consider the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that success of any military operation or campaign depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to fight and win population-centric conflicts. Sociocultural factors are an

²⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 3-05, *Special Operations*, 3-14.

essential part of Special Warfare activities that focus on the population to meet U.S. interests and objectives.²⁷

Undergoverned Territory: The RAND Corporation defines Ungovernability by using the following variables:

1. The level of state penetration of society;
2. The extent to which the state has a monopoly on the use of force;
3. The extent to which the state controls its borders;
4. Whether the state is subject to external intervention by other states; and how conducive an area is to become a terrorist safe haven.²⁸

Chapter 2 of this thesis will further clarify this definition.

²⁷ Ibid., 1-3 – 1-5.

²⁸ Rabasa et al., xvi.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The indirect approach includes empowering host nation forces, providing appropriate assistance to humanitarian agencies, and engaging key populations. These long-term efforts increase partner capabilities to generate sufficient security and rule of law, address local needs, and advance ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of violent extremism.

— Admiral (Ret) William H. McRaven,
Posture Statement to Congress 2013

In order to determine if CA can be the primary force employed in undergoverned areas, it is essential to describe the operational environment where these activities take place. Studies conducted by the RAND corporation and the NIC provide a narrative of both the current and FOEs, as well as outlining the threats. The *NSS* and similar strategic guidance documents provide an outline for both the U.S. and DoD to address the threats found in the FOE.

Each GCC develops theater strategies focused on achieving specified end states for their theaters. This strategy is the bridge between DoD activities, operations, and resources to USG policy and strategic guidance. USSOCOM aligns SOF activities with the theatre strategy and USG policy. This chapter outlines the key literature used to answer research questions in this thesis. First, this chapter examines literature that defines what makes an area undergoverned and describes the current and predicted FOEs. Next, it outlines the strategic guidance documents which provide the framework to address the threats to national security. This is followed by a review of the documents that describe how the GCCs and SOF will support national strategy. Finally, this chapter examines case studies, governmental reports, non-governmental survey reports and structured

interview reports in order to examine how CA has historically supported SOF objectives and missions in the HoA, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

Operational Environment

Several definitions of undergoverned areas exist. Dr. Robert Rotberg defines the requirements of a state as providing security. This means preventing cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; eliminating domestic threats or attacks upon the national structure; preventing crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and enabling citizens to resolve their differences with the state, without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion.²⁹ The United States Defense Strategy also offered a definition of undergoverned space as “the absence of effective governance in many parts of the world which creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents.”³⁰ Many states are unstable, and in some cases, unwilling, to exercise effective control over their territory or frontiers, thus leaving areas open to hostile exploitation. In 2007, the RAND Corporation offered a definition for the Army as well. It states that undergoverned areas are territories where the state is unable or unwilling to perform its functions. Ungoverned territories can be failed or failing states, poorly controlled land or maritime borders, or areas within otherwise viable states where the central government’s authority does not extend. Their definition of undergoverned territories does not say that these territories are devoid of governance. Rather, the existing

²⁹ Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation States Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,” in *When States Fail Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3.

³⁰ Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2005), 3.

structures of authority are not related to the formal institutions of the state. Not all undergoverned territories are equally suitable as terrorist sanctuaries or conducive to the presence of terrorist and insurgent groups.³¹ This is an important distinction, and one not found in DoD guidance.

For the purpose of this thesis, the author will use the definition provided by the RAND Corporation in “Ungoverned Territories.” Their studies on the topic of military options in undergoverned areas examined eight regions considered to be undergoverned territories in order to determine what causes a territory to become undergoverned and how to mitigate the negative effects of that environment. They are the most extensive and the ones utilized by USSOCOM. The RAND Corporation defines ungovernability using the following variables:

1. The level of state penetration of society;
2. The extent to which the state has a monopoly on the use of force;
3. The extent to which the state controls its borders;
4. Whether the state is subject to external intervention by other states; and how conducive an area is to become a terrorist safe haven.³²

Finally they offer recommendations for how the U.S. may prevent this crisis from developing and for mitigating the current undergoverned territories.

The first recommendation is to reevaluate the role of development assistance. While the U.S. tends to emphasize security cooperation and military assistance in dealing with the security problems that undergoverned territories generate, extending the reach of

³¹ Rabasa et al., xvi.

³² Ibid.

government should involve other activities too. One possible option could be to use development assistance as a tool to encourage recipient governments to invest in infrastructure and institutions in regions where they have abdicated their governing responsibilities. The CA Title 10 directive, and its core tasks, validates this recommendation and directs that CA is the lead Army component with this responsibility.

A second recommendation is to promote competent government practices. Providing expert advice to officials on how to coordinate their actions across departments and minimize bureaucratic competition, which would be an important step in strengthening public sector capabilities. This is another key task assigned to CA in Title 10. Joint doctrine also outlines Nation Assistance and Humanitarian-Civic Actions as tasks that strengthen public sector capabilities.³³ While DoS is the U.S. lead when working with host nation governance, CA can use their programs to enhance the legitimacy of that governance in instable regions.

Finally, the policy prescriptions aimed at addressing ungovernability must also reduce a region's conduciveness to terrorist activities: for example, building the capacity of the local military and counter-terrorism forces.³⁴ This is a task that DoD performs in many locations around the globe. Joint doctrine calls for the use of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and counter-terrorism activities to address a region's conduciveness for terrorist activities.³⁵ However, this study emphasizes that while FID may be extremely

³³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011).

³⁴ Rabasa et al.

³⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

useful in enhancing the capability of the government, it must be conducted in conjunction with other programs that address the ungovernability. This suggests that FID should expand its scope from merely training foreign militaries to training governance organizations.

A second article defining both the current and FOE is *Global Trends 2030 Alternative Worlds*. Published by the NIC, this report describes an ongoing and critical change in the operating environment. The transformation empowers individuals and networks with the new era of democratization. In this era, the power is shifting from states to informal groups. These small groups will have greater power to influence their environment than they do in current environments. This power includes access to disruptive technologies and an ability to project themselves beyond established state boundaries. In this environment, the NIC predicts “game changers” that will impact the future environment.

The first significant game changer described is the governance gap. In this period, a growing number of diverse-state, and non-state actors will assume governance roles in the absence of strong governments. This will not only challenge a government internally, but has the potential to present transnational challenges. These non-state actors do not recognize existing boundaries. Their legitimacy stems from ethnicities, religions, or social standings. An example of this is the Kurdish state which exists within Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. A non-state actor, the Kurdish ethnic group significantly impacts the political narratives in all four of those countries.

The next game changer predicted by the NIC is the potential for increased conflict. As non-state actors or networks begin to emerge, the likelihood for violence

increases. Many actors will use violence to protect their interests or disrupt the legitimate government. Governments with faltering institutions such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Bangladesh are more likely to produce violent non-state actors. It is reasonable to expect this high level of violence resulting in all undergoverned areas. It relates to the final game changer that applies to this thesis, which is the relationship role maintained by the U.S. The NIC proposes that if the U.S. is unable to maintain a relationship balance between the existing states and the emerging non-state actors, the international system as we know it could collapse. The U.S. must maintain a leadership role in both diplomatic and economic arenas in order for the international system to avoid an extended period of global anarchy.³⁶ This implies that a long term, capacity building campaign which projects governance into those targeted regions is vital to future U.S. security interests.

The last study which focused on clarifying the current operating environment is *The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces*, written for the Council of Foreign Relations. In this study, the author forecasts ongoing irregular threats by non-state actors such as terrorists, insurgents, and transnational criminal networks that are increasingly empowered by technology and other forces of globalization. Though the core Al-Qaeda organization has been degraded, its affiliates have grown and spread to other unstable, undergoverned, or conflict-ridden areas in the Middle East and Africa. State adversaries are also likely to resort to unconventional tactics to counter the overwhelmingly superior conventional power of the U.S. and its allies.³⁷

³⁶ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030 Alternative Worlds*.

³⁷ Robinson, *The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces*.

These studies serve to clarify both the current environment and the FOE. They all depict an environment where non-state actors and illegitimate networks will grow in power at the expense of the established states that we recognize currently. They also make recommendations to the USG, stressing the importance of its involvement. The U.S. must address these emerging threats through a combination of military intervention and diplomatic action. The U.S. must bolster the legitimacy of host nation governments in these unstable regions and partner with them to create a more stable environment. These are all roles in which DoD, the GCC's, SOF, and CA have all been heavily involved.

Strategic Guidance

The most important works of strategic guidance are the National Security Strategies which address the dangers that the FOE will present to U.S interests. The 2010 NSS recognized that failing states breed conflict and endanger regional and global security sets about to help states avoid becoming terrorist safe havens, by helping them build their capacity for responsible governance and security, through development and security sector assistance. By assisting countries that are trying to transition to a democratic nation, the U.S. strives to support governments that are able to maintain their legitimacy and influence. The strategy seeks to apply the skills of our military, diplomats, and development experts in order to prevent the emergence of conflict.³⁸

As expected, the 2015 NSS maintained the development and capacity building programs that were initiated in 2010. However, the shadow of ISIS, Boko Haram, and

³⁸ The President, *National Security Strategy*, 2010.

other insurgent threats added gravity to these initiatives. Concerning Iraq, the *NSS* remains committed to supporting the existing government as long as they embrace sectarian equality and provide effective governance. The government situation in Syria is deemed completely ineffective and illegitimate; therefore the *NSS* is committed to supporting the rebel leaders who might provide effective and legitimate government. For a strategic document, this is a clear directive to support effective government in order to deny insurgent safe haven. The emerging strategy remains clear. Within states, the nexus of weak governance and widespread grievance allows extremism to take root, violent non-state actors to rise up, and conflict to overtake state structures. To meet these challenges, the U.S. will continue to work with partners and through multilateral organizations to address the root causes of conflict before they erupt and to contain and resolve them when they do. The U.S. prefers to partner with those fragile states that have a genuine political commitment to establishing legitimate governance and providing for their people.³⁹

The next strategic document that describes the how the DoD will address the challenges presented by the environment is the *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*. This document highlights the training of foreign security forces as a critical component of DoD's security cooperation strategy. Much of the *Quadrennial Defense Review* is focused on the ungovernability problem. The conduct of FID has been given a high priority with the aim of improving the defense self-sufficiency of certain countries around the world. The objective is to assist U.S. allies and partners in securing their own borders, thus improving their ability to deal with terrorist threats and incidents and reducing the

³⁹ The President, *National Security Strategy*, 2015.

burden on U.S. forces, in the event that the employment of U.S. military forces is required in the future.⁴⁰ It appears that DoD is seeking a scalable force that can prevent conflict or prepare the environment if conflict is inevitable.

Geographic Combatant Commands

Joint Publication 5-0 states that Geographic Commanders develop theater strategy. They employ theater strategy to align and focus efforts and resources to mitigate and prepare for conflict and contingencies in their Area of Responsibility (AOR) and support and advance U.S. interests. To support this goal, theater strategies normally emphasize security cooperation activities, building partner capacity, force posture, and preparation for contingencies. Theater strategies typically employ military and regional engagement, close cooperation with DoS, embassies, and other federal agencies as ways to achieve theater objectives.⁴¹

As the GCC's develop their theater strategies or Theater Campaign Plans, they will often categorize them into phases. The most traditional phase model is the six phase model of shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority.⁴² This model is flexible, but helps link subordinate plans and efforts. This thesis will focus on phase zero, one, and five as these three phases are where SOF and CA are most likely to operate in undergoverned territories, in support of GCC objectives.

⁴⁰ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2014).

⁴¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

⁴² Ibid.

The shape phase or phase zero is defined as joint and multinational operations—inclusive of normal and routine military activities—where various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies.⁴³ The activities in this phase are continuous with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation, in support of defined national strategic and strategic military objectives. The activities during phase zero ensure success by shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and partner nations, developing partner nation and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, improving information exchange and Intelligence sharing, and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.

The deter phase or phase one is defined as activities to deter undesirable adversary action, by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It includes activities to prepare forces and set conditions for deployment and employment of forces in the event that deterrence is not successful.⁴⁴ Once the crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization; tailoring of forces and other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; or increased security cooperation activities. Many actions in the deter phase build on security cooperation activities from phase zero. These critical actions are part of the security cooperation activities.

The subsequent three phases are seize the initiative, dominate, and stabilize. In these phases, the level of instability, violence, or enemy activity has escalated to the point

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

that the host nation is illegitimate, nonexistent, or adversary. In these phases, the U.S. will seek to deploy all required capabilities, and break the enemies will to resist.⁴⁵ While stability programs, and CA activities are used in these phases, the objective is not to prevent or deter conflict, therefore this thesis does not focus on CA activities from phase three to phase five.

Phase six is the support to civil authority phase. This phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in theater. Depending upon the level of indigenous state capacity, joint force activities during phase six may be at the behest of that authority or they may be under its direction. The goal is for the joint force to enable the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to the largest number of people in the region. This includes coordination of joint force actions with supporting or supported multinational, agency, and other organization participants, and continuing integrated finance operations and security cooperation activities to influence the attitude of the population favorably, regarding the U.S. and local civil authority's objectives.⁴⁶

Special Operations Forces

In 2013, LTG Charles Cleveland, the USASOC Commander published his guidance for future SOF activities. This guidance was captured in ARSOF 2022 and served to ensure that the training, education, equipping, and deploying of all SOF Soldiers were firmly nested with *NSS* and *Quadrennial Defense Review* guidance. He

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

assessed that Army SOF would be required to operate in an extremely uncertain environment and his guidance reflects this. The described environment is characterized by an irregular balance of power between both state and non-state actors. The shift in the nation's tolerance away from large-scale joint operations, coupled with the complexity of the FOE, create a growing gap between national action and inaction, while giving our adversaries broader freedom of action and encouraging increased instability. The reality of this changing paradigm requires USASOC and the USSOCOM to build new strategic options for the nation.

Army Special Operations Forces 2022 served to outline several key priorities. One of these priorities, key to this thesis, states that ARSOF must bridge the critical seams of SOF-IA relationships to effectively contribute to unified action in the 21st century, by partnering with the Army to meet its Title 10 collective training responsibilities. ARSOF must facilitate the interdependence of SOF, the interagency and conventional forces in support of unified action and unified land operations, through the Mission Command Training Program.

One of the initiatives in support of this priority was to facilitate the blending of capabilities between the DoD and the interagency into one uninterrupted spectrum of options for U.S. policy makers, while acting as the Army lead for SOF-IA interdependence. A second initiative was to develop the capability of the 95th CA Brigade CONUS-based headquarters to leverage the USG's civil-sector expertise.⁴⁷

In 2014, Cleveland revisited his guidance in ARSOF 2022 part 2. In this document, he outlined the development of three key programs that increase the range of

⁴⁷ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, "ARSOF 2022."

capabilities and choices available to the GCCs and TSOCs. The first was the development of a Civil Information node to allow unified action partners, and other nonmilitary “forces” that have a direct relationship to success in wars among the people, to connect to commercial wireless internet and share information during humanitarian—disaster response efforts. This exponentially increases information-gathering capacity and enables CA to share timely and relevant information with our interagency, host nation and NGO—intergovernmental organization partners within special warfare mission sets. This allows CA to build and share the common operating picture with DoS and IA partners which will increase the effectiveness of SOF working in undergoverned areas during phase zero or phase one.

The next key programs were the IMMSG and the CMAG; the definitions section of this thesis outlines both of these programs. These programs provide the GCC and TSOC Commanders the capability to more effectively collaborate with DoS.⁴⁸ Since a whole of government approach is critical when addressing threats presented by undergoverned territories, programs and organizations that can synchronize DoS and DoD objectives become valuable.

An additional description of SOF activities in undergoverned territories that this thesis uses comes from the book, *Going Big, by Getting Small*. In this book, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Brian Petit analyzes Special Operations approaches in phase zero environments and makes conclusions on how SOF can effectively accomplish DoD objectives in support of the GCC strategy and U.S. country team plans. The key conclusion is that SOF in phase zero is interagency interdependent and capable of

⁴⁸ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, “ARSOF 2022 Part II.”

employing low visibility methods to achieve foreign policy objectives. LTC Petit measures SOF impact by increased host nation capability, positive publicity for host nation actions, and relationships that can survive crises.⁴⁹

In 2012, USSOCOM Directive 525-38 provided guidance and direction on the execution of the CME program. This directive captured a program that had been in execution for several years, but lacked formal guidance. The active component SOF CA CMSEs are the executors of the CME program. These elements are scalable and modular, and deploy at the request of Combatant Commanders, a Chief of Mission, or a TSOC in support of Theater Campaign Plans. Unlike Army funded Major Force Programs (MFP-2) that are used to support conventional forces, CME is a baseline MFP-11 program which is to be used in support of SOF forces.

The core activities of CME are population centric within a specific country, region, or area of interest; they are:

1. Gain and maintain access to areas of interest.
2. Establish enduring relationships and networks with populations and key stakeholders.
3. Address critical civil vulnerabilities, such as ethnic conflict, that could be exploited by destabilizing factors or groups. Address whether the civil vulnerabilities are natural or man-made.
4. Plan, coordinate, facilitate and execute SOF specific programs (Unconventional Warfare support), operations, and activities, synchronizing short-to-mid-term objectives with mid-to-long term USG objectives.

⁴⁹ Petit.

5. Conduct activities by, with, and through host nation authorities, USG partners, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs, private entities, or international military partners to deny support to violent extremist organizations or networks and enable indigenously sustainable stability and development.
6. Increase USSOCOM, GCC, TSOC, U.S. country team, and USG situational awareness. Provide understanding of key areas and populations to enable future operations planning through CIM.⁵⁰

This program appears to be tailor made for addressing the threats posed by undergoverned areas. Its small-footprint, and the training and education of CA personnel, makes the CMSE ideal to operate in sensitive or high risk austere environments. A CMSE strives to implement theater strategic and U.S. policy objectives and nest them within the programs of an embassy or supported commander.

In 2014, Colonel (COL) Brent Bartos completed a thesis report while at the Joint War College. His central thesis sought to demonstrate that the USSOCOM CME program is uniquely tailored for low cost, small-footprint military activities in conjunction with UAP and partner nation organizations, as a means of implementing the Nation's Defense Strategy. In broad terms, he describes how the CME program provides a model for effective government cooperation needed to maintain and sustain influence through the 21st Century with the fiscal realities. His thesis examined CME case studies from Vietnam, Jordan, and Bangladesh. These case studies demonstrate that by working through UAPs, persistent presence, and proactively supporting national interests, the

⁵⁰ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Directive 525-38, *Civil Military Engagement*, 4.

CME program serves as a platform to preemptively mitigate indigenous support to violent extremists and their networks.

There are obvious similarities in the findings of Bartos' thesis and the proposals of this thesis. Both recognize that the CME program provides DoD a unique capability to bridge gaps with UAPs and partner nations, while addressing the security challenges facing the nation.⁵¹ This thesis examined the CA mission in three regionally diverse areas; the HoA, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. These studies show how the CME program provides a capability to address security threats derived from undergoverned regions. Despite the similarities, Bartos' conclusions did not address if the CME program can be effective in undergoverned areas. This thesis concurs with the findings of Bartos, but seeks to explore the utility of the CME program as a means of addressing undergoverned threat areas.

Current Civil Affairs Education

In 2011, Major General (MG) Bennet S. Sacolick, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Commander, directed the CA Proponent to revise the CA training pipeline. The training prior to this point was not institutionalized, and was not clearly linked to a desired outcome. The revised outcome was a CA Soldier, capable of operating in politically sensitive environments and more capable of identifying and mitigating sources of instability. In 2013, LTG Cleveland, USASOC Commander, and the Commander of the Special Warfare Training Group, COL Miguel A. Correa,

⁵¹ COL Brent M. Bartos, USA, "The United States Special Operations Command Civil Military Engagement Program - A Model for Military-Interagency Low Cost/Small Footprint Activities" (Master's Degree, Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, April 2014).

directed continued change to not only the CA training pipeline, but the Special Forces and Psychological Operations courses as well. The desired outcome was an integrated Special Operations Force that understood how to synchronize the capabilities of each Regiment in support of the Commander's objectives. Figure 1 portrays the current Active CA Qualification Course (CAQC).




Figure 1. Current CAQC

Source: B/3/1st SWTG, "CAQC Pipeline" (Civil Affairs Qualification Brief, October 2013), accessed 14 September 2014, JFKSWCS Share Point.

Because of these Commander's directives, the training pipeline transformation continued. The CA pipeline began integrating more DoS training, strategic planning, and engagements training. They focused primarily on being able to assess, identify, and mitigate sources of instability. This level of training was unavailable to any of the CA

teams studied in this thesis and is a significant step towards a more effective CA Course.

The future CAQC will include increased education in strategic planning for the CA

Officers, and increased CR training for the Non-Commissioned Officers. The existing

changes already address the concerns raised about the training of CA in the HoA.

Combined with the future changes, CA Soldiers should be much more capable of gaining

access to undergoverned territories and increasing stability, in support of both SOF and

DoS objectives. Figure 2 depicts the future Active CAQC.




Figure 2. Future CAQC

Source: B/3/1st SWTG, "38A and 38B 02-14 Proposal" (Civil Affairs Concept Brief, Fort Bragg, NC, 15 December 2014).

The changes made to the CA training pipeline were just the first step. In 2014, the

1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) introduced two new Special Warfare

courses focused on improving the effectiveness of SOF Soldiers conducting Special

Warfare activities globally. The first course was the Operational Design Course. This course's outcome was to develop a SOF Soldier who will be able to design and plan long-duration, low visibility, SOF Centric contributions to campaigns, that bridges Tactical SOF Capability to Strategic Objectives.⁵² This course not only enhances the strategic understanding of CA Soldiers, it allows all SOF Soldiers to plan together. CA Soldiers who graduate from this course will not only be able to gain access to undergoverned territories for SOF. They will be able to plan all their programs that maximize support for SOF, DoS, and DoD objectives.

The second Special Warfare course introduced was the Network Development Course. The outcome of this course was to educate a SOF Soldier to design, develop, assess, vet, protect, and expand complex indigenous networks in support of Phase one and two U.S. sponsored resistance objectives.⁵³ This training is critical for CA Soldiers working in undergoverned territories. As the sole SOF representatives in those areas, CA Soldiers must, in particular, understand how to design and enhance civil networks. As CA Soldiers are building relationships in undergoverned areas, their ability to spearhead SOF into those areas is enhanced tremendously by the attendance of this course.

In contrast, the Reserve training course has not changed since 2006. Reserve CA Soldiers receive most of their basic CA training via distance learning, and then attend a 30 day condensed course. The Reserve course strives to replicate all of the training objectives and outcomes found in the Active training pipeline. However, it appears

⁵² COL Miguel A. Correa, "1st SWTG Capabilities in Support of ARSOF 2022" (Global Area Command Meeting, Fort Bragg, NC, May 2014).

⁵³ Ibid.

difficult to replicate a 49-week face-to-face course with a 30-day condensed course. In addition, while doctrine directs the Reserve CA force to maintain their functional specialties, there is no education or training provided in the Reserve CAQC that supports this directive.⁵⁴ Figure 3 depicts the Reserve CAQC. Not all CA Soldiers receive equivalent training, and therefore should not be expected to conduct equivalent mission sets.




Figure 3. Reserve CAQC

Source: B/3/1st SWTG, “CAQC Pipeline” (Civil Affairs Qualification Brief, October 2013), accessed 14 September 2014, JFKSWCS Share Point.

⁵⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 1-8.

Horn of Africa



Figure 4. Horn of Africa

Source: Department of State, “The Horn of Africa,” accessed 3 April 2015, <http://m.state.gov/md169532.htm>.

After clarifying the environment, strategic guidance, and the GCC and SOF objectives, this thesis examines three regionally diverse CA missions in undergoverned territories. This examination will clarify if and how CA can support SOF objectives in undergoverned territories. The HoA research included three case studies, one governmental report, and one Command directed report. The first HoA case study reviewed was developed by Doctor Stephen Burgess.

His study, “Has the U.S. Military in The Horn of Africa been a Force that Embraces Strategic Knowledge and Perspective in Countering Violent Extremism and Assisting with Sustainable Development?” outlines military activity in the HoA from

2003 to 2012. Since CA activities made up 60 percent of the military efforts at the time, much of the study focuses on the effectiveness of CA. His conclusions are CA and the Military as a whole, were unable to understand the strategic implications of their efforts, were ineffective when adjusting to a title 22 zone, and had issues when trying to verify the long-term effectiveness of their efforts. His study also concluded that the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Commanders had an unrealized expectation of the CA forces. He cites organizational structure and a lack of standardized education and PMT as primary reasons the Command lost faith in the Civil Affairs efforts.⁵⁵

Ms. Jessica Lee and Ms. Maureen Farrell, of the Social Science Research Center at U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Socio-Cultural Research and Advisory Team at the CJTF-HoA identified similar conclusions in their separate AFRICOM directed report. Their study evaluated the overall performance of CA teams in HoA and identified that a lack of a long-term CA plan inhibited the CA team's ability to articulate their mission or define long-term success. This report concurred with Burgess by saying that the CA teams were ineffective when trying to adjust to a title 22 zone. A new finding from this study was that CA teams lacked the cultural, linguistic, and interagency training needed to be effective in the HoA.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Dr. Stephen F. Burgess, "Has the U.S. Military in The Horn of Africa been a Force that Embraces Strategic Knowledge and Perspective in Countering Violent Extremism and Assisting with Sustainable Development?" (Research Report, U.S. Air War College, 2013).

⁵⁶ Jessica Lee and Maureen Farrell, "A Study of CA in East Africa. Nov 2009-Jul 2010" (Report, Africa Command Knowledge Development, September 2010).

The report on SOF activities conducted by the U.S. Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) echoes the AFRICOM report findings. The GAO conducted independent research into the effectiveness of SOF and CA activities in the HoA. Their report highlighted a lack of CA programs being nested with the strategic goals, lack of long-term assessments to determine if the CA projects were effective, and a lack of cultural and language training for the CA teams.⁵⁷ There is a common trend that is consistent among all of this literature. A lack of strategic understanding, lack of interagency training, and a lack of title 22 awareness hindered the effectiveness of CA teams in the HoA.

The Tuft Report, conducted in 2010, provides the most damning view of CA activities in the HoA. While it acknowledges that from a U.S. military perspective, CA activities have tactically helped the U.S. military to establish a limited presence in a region and among populations that historically are a threat to the Kenyan state and a current risk to the USG. In theory, this presence enables the U.S. military to build connections and networks and acquire knowledge about the population that may augment intelligence, help to influence local leadership or to facilitate a military intervention, should the need arise. However, from a strategic perspective the study finds that the experience in the Horn of Africa-Kenya illustrates the limitations of using foreign aid as a tool for countering insurgency, terrorism, or violent extremism.

The authors, Mark Bradbury and Michael Klienman attribute the failure of the CA efforts largely to ongoing Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They propose that U.S.

⁵⁷ Government Accountability Office, GAO 10-504, *Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task Force* (Washington, DC: Governmental Accountability Office, April 2010).

development assistance was less likely to influence Muslims in the HoA than their ideological and religious connections to their brothers in the Middle East. However, the authors raise valid concerns about the scale of CA aid and its synchronization with DoS efforts. While CA Soldiers have executed numerous projects, they were often scattered throughout the countryside and are not complimentary in a way that affects change. For example, one well per district is not as productive to improving infrastructure as a well system in a district.

The authors concern with DoS synchronization is the most poignant and may have led to the overall downfall of CA in the HoA. While CA teams claimed to attend embassy meetings to coordinate their efforts, both DoS and NGO employees reported not seeing them. As a result, DoS employees perceived DoD to be a version of the amateur hour; building random projects without understanding what it takes to actually create sustainable development. The authors propose that if DoD, and its CA element had sought to expand DoS presence, they would have been more effective.⁵⁸

The last case study evaluated was conducted by a former CA Team Leader. Captain (CPT) Jessica Piombo's assignment to the HoA provided her with many insights to the inefficiencies found there. She highlights the CA teams, who lacking strategic understanding, conducted "good idea" activities rather than activities nested with the strategic endstate. In contrast, there were embassy and higher headquarter staffs that seemed more concerned with administrative requirements, than accomplishing their

⁵⁸ Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, "Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Kenya" (Research, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2010).

mission.⁵⁹ Military teams that are ineffective in a title 22 environment, incapable of nesting their objectives with the strategic plans, and lacking the training necessary to operate in politically sensitive areas, will never achieve long-term effectiveness in undergoverned areas.

The studies conducted on the HoA provide an outstanding platform to evaluate the primary question this thesis seeks to ask. Is the CA Regiment capable of addressing the threats found in undergoverned regions? The studies show that the Reserve CA teams were able to gain access into their targeted regions, but were ineffective when asked to perform beyond the tactical level, or produce continuous Civil Information. Despite the ultimate failure of CA in the HoA, these studies identify multiple opportunities where the teams could have been successful. This thesis will compare the actions of the teams in the HoA with teams that were successful in other regions, to determine how the teams in the HoA could have been more effective. This will support the final conclusions, which are applicable in all regions.

⁵⁹ Jessica Piombo, “Military Provision of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: A Day in the Life of a Civil Affairs Team in the Horn of Africa” (Case Study, Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 2010).

Pakistan



Figure 5. Pakistan

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, “Pakistan,” World Factbook, accessed 3 April 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>.

Pakistan has experienced governance challenges ever since the British Government established its boundaries. Analysts have noted that undergoverned territories comprise nearly 60 percent of Pakistan’s territory. This lack of governance has negative consequences for regional stability and impacts neighboring Afghanistan, Iran, and India. The main areas in Pakistan that exhibit this are the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Baluchistan and the Southern Punjab.⁶⁰ This thesis examines the operations conducted by SOF and CA in the FATA region.

⁶⁰ Raza Ahmad Rumi, “Pakistan: Undergoverned Spaces”(CIDOB Policy Research Project, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2012).

Most of the specific SOF operations are classified. However, the studies conducted by the RAND Corporation depict Pakistan as a country that meets every definition of an undergoverned territory. Pakistan historically lacks government infrastructure in its rural and border areas. This turned its society into an undergoverned space, challenging the authority of the central government. These regions along the border created a vacuum, which no one was ready to fill. As we have examined, undergoverned territories are the best places for harboring terrorists and criminals, and have the conduciveness for VEOs to grow.⁶¹

As a result of the security classifications, the majority of the data for this thesis was obtained utilizing structured interviews with SOF and DoS personnel who operated in Pakistan between 2007 and 2009. The first SOF Soldier interviewed was a CA Team Leader who operated in the FATA regions of Pakistan during 2007. During this deployment, the CA Team was very successful at gaining access into the undergoverned regions. The entire SOF element was able to capitalize on this access by initiating FID and Intelligence programs, along with the traditional targeting process. However, as time passed, the short-term access was no longer the priority for DoS or SOF. As with all undergoverned areas, the ultimate goal is that the host nation governance structure is able to penetrate the local societies.

Recognizing this potential failure, the SOF element asked the CA Team Leader to return in 2009. The mission this time was to work in the U.S. Embassy and ensure that all SOF programs were properly synchronized with the Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP). The Team Leader had three subordinate CA teams in the FATA region, but the

⁶¹ Rabasa et al., 45-50.

overall objectives remained subordinate to the SOF objectives. In this capacity, the Team Leader worked daily with USAID, DoS, and some of their implementing partners. As a result, the Pakistani Government was able to gain a greater foothold into the FATA region. The interview with this team leader focused on how the CA Team was able to gain access into those undergoverned areas, how their access enabled the accomplishment of SOF objectives, and how they were able to synchronize activities with DoS.⁶²

While the CA Team Leader was working in Pakistan, USAID was one of their primary DoS partners. USAID appeared to have the funds, material, and resources to expand their programs into the FATA region, but they lacked the Pakistani Government structure to partner with in the FATA region. As the CA team gained access, and began to conduct FID with the local governance and militias, governance structures were created that USAID and DoS could work with. Supporting this growth, USAID provided the CA team with the resources to gain the initial access. They followed it up by solidifying the governance relationships that were identified by the CA team. This thesis used information obtained in an interview with one of the USAID program managers who worked with the CA team in 2007 and 2009.⁶³

Finally, this thesis sought the perspective of the SOF element in charge of the entire operation in Pakistan. While the CA team was able to gain access into the FATA and expand DoS support to governance, their actions were intended to support SOF objectives. Therefore, an interview was conducted with the Special Operations Command

⁶² CA TL in Pakistan 2007 and 2009, interview by author, Fort Bragg, NC, 17 December 2014.

⁶³ USAID-OTI Deputy Director Pakistan 2007-2010, telephonic interview by author, 18 February 2015.

Forward (SOCFWD)-Pakistan Commander. He operated in Pakistan from 2009 through 2010 and worked directly with the CA Team Leader. This interview provided an understanding for what the SOCFWD-Pakistan mission was and what the CA team was expected to accomplish. The 2009 through 2010 mission was significant because it was the last mission that SOF conducted in the FATA region. At that time, the Pakistani Government began denying further visa extensions for the SOF element in Pakistan; therefore, their mission ended.

It is easy to conclude that, if the SOF element was asked to leave the FATA, their mission must have been a failure; the case studies from the HoA certainly ended in this fashion. However; the interview with the SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander showed that SOF was no longer needed because the Pakistani Government was able to affect the populace in the FATA region, and the insurgent activity in that region decreased drastically. This demonstrated that the primary purpose of the U.S. involvement was complete and those regions had increased its governance. Once the Pakistani Government was recognized in this region, U.S. presence was no longer appropriate. The government still required U.S. support, but this support came from the DoS or through USAID, rather than through SOF Soldiers on the ground.⁶⁴

In 2010, a non-governmental study conducted by the New America Foundation validated the conclusion of the SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander. This study provided a good background of the FATA regions; highlighting the governance structures that existed in Pakistan prior to 2001. These structures consisted of local militias and tribes,

⁶⁴ SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander 2009, interview by author, Fort Bragg, NC, 18 December 2014.

which were not inherently violent or anti-Pakistan, but preferred a style of self-governance. The Pakistani Government allowed this to continue because they lacked the ability and motivation to penetrate those regions adequately. Al-Qaida began to exploit these undergoverned regions in 2003, resulting in increased attacks on the U.S. and the Pakistani Government.

This study goes on to outline the U.S. and Pakistani responses to these insurgent activities. The responses include the actions taken by SOF, which are identified in the study as counter-insurgency programs. The most interesting aspect of this study is a survey that they conducted in the FATA region. This is the first time a survey was conducted in that area and it focused on identifying local perceptions of the U.S., Pakistani governance, insurgent groups, corruption, and the judicial system. The results showed that while the SOF programs were initially effective, it was ultimately the governance infrastructure and reforms that led to increased governance in the FATA. The reforms, which began in 2009, allow secular political parties to compete in Pakistani elections, thus increasing political participation, and reform in the judicial processes that the local militias perceive to be unfair.⁶⁵

The CA team in Pakistan was very successful. This success was initially confined to gaining access into the FATA by providing essential services. This access, which was considered a vital capability, possessed only by the CA unit, supported several SOF objectives. It enabled the identification and targeting of the insurgent networks, and

⁶⁵ Brian Fishman, "The Battle for Pakistan Militancy and Conflict Across the FATA and NWFP" (Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New America Foundation, 2010), accessed 14 January 2015, <http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/fishman.pdf>.

allowed the SOF element to conduct FID with the local militias and the Frontier Corps; the acting government. This success was solidified when the team enabled the Pakistani Government to expand into the FATA region. This success was reinforced by the independent, non-U.S. Government study that recognized the success of the SOF programs, and described the governance programs as the critical component for current and future success. This thesis will evaluate how the CA team was able to achieve success, and identify ways that they could have increased their effectiveness. The Pakistan mission provides a great example of how CA provided a critical capability to achieve both SOF and DoS objectives.

Sri Lanka



Figure 6. Sri Lanka

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, “Sri Lanka,” World Factbook, accessed 3 April 2015, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html>.

The final research focuses on the CA efforts in Sri Lanka; multiple documents highlight the historical unrest in Sri Lanka. In 2009, the Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. However, while the Tamil insurgency may have gone underground in the short-term, without addressing the root causes of conflict, the possibility for long-term violence remains. The Sri Lankan Government still lacks a clear political ability to stabilize the country and enhance government legitimacy. This lack of legitimacy facilitates the many pockets of undergoverned territories in Sri Lanka.

Despite the occupation by Sri Lankan Military and the increasing presence of Sinhalese in the North, the Tamil minority feel that “Jaffna is being invaded by Sinhalese. We are losing our culture.”⁶⁶ Continued media censorship, illegal detention, and human rights abuses inhibit the freedom of Tamil citizens. The Sri Lankan Government is working to decrease its military presence with tangible improvements to Tamil’s populated regions. This is often in the form of infrastructure development, increased economic aid, and inclusionary measures designed to increase Tamil participation in local and national governance. Without government implemented non-military measures, the Tamil insurgency is likely to remain dormant; only waiting for the right opportunity to re-emerge.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Jason Burke, “Tamils want an end to Sri Lanka Discrimination after Election,” *The Observer*, 3 April 2010, accessed 27 September 2014, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/04/sri-lanka-elections-tamil-minority>.

⁶⁷ James Beaulieu, “Protracted State Insurgencies: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colombia” (Thesis, Georgetown University, April 2010), accessed 4 October 2014, <https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/553445>.

The SOF or U.S. Military presence in Sri Lanka is still immature, and lacks published case studies. In 2009, a CA Team Leader was the first Special Operations Soldier sent to Sri Lanka. In addition to achieving the Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) objectives, the team was tasked to gain access to the undergoverned regions of Sri Lanka and set the conditions for an increased SOF presence.⁶⁸ Although there is no literature published on the activities conducted by this CA team, interviews with the CA Team Leader outlined specifically how he was able to gain access into Sri Lanka, and provided an overview of his programs and their objectives.

The CA community and USASOC, consider this mission in Sri Lanka a success and an example for future missions. This is specifically because of the information that he was able to provide to SOCPAC, resulting in better planning conducted by that Headquarters. By the end of his deployment, the entire SOF element was able to operate in country and work directly to counter the insurgent threats. All of this success was created by his ability to synchronize his activities with DoS, and expand their support to governance in the targeted regions. The CMAG Director emphasized that all of the Sri Lankan team leader's success was due to this ability. As they assist CA programs globally, the CMAG uses the Sri Lanka mission as a model for success for new team leaders.⁶⁹ The CAQC also utilizes this mission as an example of proper SOF-DoS

⁶⁸ The Civil Affairs Team Leader deployed to Sri Lanka was assigned to the same company as the author of this thesis. Through parallel planning, the author became aware of the scope of the mission in Sri Lanka.

⁶⁹ CMAG Director, interview by author, Fort Bragg, NC, 17 December 2014.

synchronization.⁷⁰ Therefore, despite the single source of information, this thesis will analyze how the CA team was successful at gaining access into Sri Lanka and how he supported and expanded the programs of both DoS and SOF simultaneously.

Summary

This chapter examined literature that described both the current and FOE. Combined with U.S. strategic guidance, the literature predicted that illegitimate or absent government will create the most complex threats to U.S. security. GCC and SOF guidance directs capacity building and deterrence as the primary method of addressing these threats. ADM (Ret) McRaven and USSOCOM proposed that CA provided SOF a unique capability to strengthen partner nation governance, specifically through the CME program.

In order to answer the primary research question, this thesis also examined case studies, governmental reports, non-governmental survey reports and structured interview reports, in order to examine how CA has historically supported SOF objectives in the HoA, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. These CA missions had varied levels of success and chapter 3 describes the methods used to analyze them.

⁷⁰ B/3/1st SWTG, “CAQC Pipeline” (Civil Affairs Qualification Brief, October 2013), accessed 14 September 2014, JFKSWCS share point.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This thesis examines three regionally diverse examples where CA units were tasked to accomplish SOF objectives in undergoverned areas. Each mission was analyzed to determine how CA planned and executed their missions. The research also examined CA' ability to support both SOF and the U.S. country team objectives and expanded DoS influence in undergoverned territories. Using these trends, the researcher identified key methods of enhancing the effective ways of synchronizing Active, Reserve, and emerging CA capabilities into a campaign and how to apply them to an undergoverned area.

The researcher used a qualitative methodology to obtain and analyze supporting data. Data from the HoA was collected through a review of three published case studies, two governmental reports, and one internal study conducted by AFRICOM. Extensive literature is lacking for both the SOF and CA programs in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, therefore, the author conducted structured interviews with subject matter experts. These interviews were based on a purposeful sampling to ensure participants either performed a SOF mission in an undergoverned area or supported one. For the purposes of confidentiality, no names or personal identifiable information of the interviewees are used; the researcher utilizes duty position for identification and general dates for historical context. Each individual interviewed signed an informed consent form prior to beginning the interview. The author will secure all research materials for three years in accordance with DoD Instruction 3216.02, while the Command and General Staff Officers Course's Quality Assurance Office will secure all informed consent forms for the same period. In addition to answering the primary research question, the analysis for

all the data collected focused on answering the secondary research questions. Appendix B is an example of the interview questions asked.

Due to the multiple case studies on the HoA, the only related interviews conducted were with the IMMSG and the CMAG. These interviews focused on how these two organizations could have, theoretically, enhanced the HoA mission. For the sake of confidentiality, only the names and dates that have already been published in case studies appear in this thesis.

In October of 2014, the RAND Corporation released their study on the SOF mission to Pakistan, but this study has not been declassified yet. Therefore, the data for this thesis was gathered using structured interviews. The personnel interviewed were: a CA Team Leader who was deployed to Pakistan in 2007 and 2009, and the SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander, who was responsible for the entire SOF mission, with supported CA teams. A separate interview was conducted with the U.S. country team member who was also in Pakistan during this timeframe. All the interviewees were asked identical questions, in order to clarify the level of integration CA was able to achieve with the other agencies.

In 2009, the CA Team Leader assigned to Sri Lanka was the first, and only, SOF Soldier sent to Sri Lanka. In addition to achieving SOCPAC objectives, the team spearheaded SOF activities in Sri Lanka and set the conditions for an increased SOF presence. Because of the groundbreaking work conducted by the CA Team Leader, the RAND Corporation developed a study that outlines the ways CA was able to not only spearhead SOF activities, but DoS activities as well. However, the RAND Corporation developed this case study in June 2014 and has not yet released it for public use.

Interviews conducted with the CA Team Leader outlined specifically how he was able to spearhead SOF activities in a specific undergoverned territory.

While the research on Sri Lanka is limited to interviewing one CA Soldier, the benefits of analyzing his mission outweigh the limitations because he was a CA Soldier who successfully spearheaded SOF activities in an undergoverned territory and isolated country. Every effort was made to protect the team leader's confidentiality. However, the positive notoriety of his mission made it impossible to fully protect his confidentiality within the SOF community. Therefore, all information used in this thesis was reviewed by the CA Team Leader.

The final interviews were conducted with the foundational leadership of the IMMSG and CMAG. The former Director of the CMAG and the Deputy Director of the IMMSG were interviewed. These interviews examined their emerging CA capabilities and determined how these organizations can and have supported CA efforts in the three researched countries. It also examined how they are organized to support future missions in undergoverned areas. Appendix D provides a sample of the interview questions asked.

After compiling the information from the interviews and case studies, the author analyzed the information and answered the secondary research questions. After a thorough presentation of the findings through descriptive analysis in chapter 4, the researcher will present the findings, recommendations, and future research considerations in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Ineffective governance create areas that terrorists and insurgents can exploit. CA forces address these threats by serving as the vanguard of DoD's support to U.S. Government efforts to assist partner governments.

— Department of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010

Small-scale and scattered projects did little to win hearts and minds or change perceptions of the U.S. in the communities where their (CA/ HoA) projects were implemented.

— USAID, *Civilian-Military Operations Guide*, February 2010

This chapter provides the results of the qualitative analysis outlined in the previous chapter. The first portion of this chapter analyzes case studies and reports conducted on the CA missions in the HoA. Next, this chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the data collected through interviews with CA, SOF, and DoS personnel who supported the missions in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Finally, this chapter analyzes interviews conducted with the IMMSG and CMAG directors. The purpose of all this data analysis is to outline how the CA Regiment has historically accomplished SOF objectives in undergoverned territories. In addition to answering the primary research question, the analysis highlights key principles that were common to all the researched areas. When applied, these principles greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the CA team as it gained access to, and expanded, the SOF mission in undergoverned territories.

This thesis proposes that the CA Regiment is the optimal SOF solution to threats which abide in undergoverned areas. Its ability to gain and maintain access into undergoverned areas, identify the sources of instability through CR and assessments, and its ability to expand DoS support to local governance, reinforces this proposal. In support,

this thesis will examine each region by first identifying the mission of CA in that region and what their respective role was in the regional plan. Next this thesis examines how the CA teams conducted their CR and area assessments. This thesis then examines how the teams capitalized on their reconnaissance to produce actionable information for both DoS and SOF. Finally, this thesis examines how CA was able to synchronize SOF and DoS objectives in support of the overall plan. By separating the research from each region in this manner, it will not only address the thesis proposal, it will also provide insight on CA capabilities that require improvements.

Horn of Africa

Mission and Primary Role

The first and fourth tenants of the undergoverned definition applies to the situation in the HoA. First, is the level of state penetration into a society; the governments of the nations in the (HoA) historically were unable to exert influence into the regions along their boundaries. Tribal affiliations have superseded the government's authority in those regions. This does not imply that there are always conflicts between the government and these tribes; simply, the tribe's self-interest is greater than their interest in the state.⁷¹

The states in the HoA also struggle to maintain internal control. Outside agencies and states are able to exert control beyond their boundaries. The Mendera Triangle is a region in the HoA that contains the Kenyan-Somalian-Ethiopian borders. In this triangle, states are able to export their influence into their neighbor's boundaries. This imbalance

⁷¹ Rabasa et al.

of state power creates an environment where the sovereign government is unable to maintain control within its boundaries. In such regions, VEOs are able to find safe havens, and grow, absent government interference.⁷²

The CA mission in the HoA was typical of most CA mission statements; it was simply go to the HoA and conduct CA Operations. This mission statement proved to be extremely confusing for the CA teams. In the study conducted by Jessica Lee and Maureen Farrell, the researchers consistently found that each member had different perceptions of his-her team's mission. In addition to a lack of clarity on the part of the CA team, this caused a lack of trust from the embassy staff and host nation forces. Table 1 depicts the numerous missions that the CA teams conducted during the eight-month period from November 2009 to July 2010 alone.⁷³ The mission sets highlighted are not incorrect or inadequate; the CA team's failure came from their inability to nest their tactical activities within the strategic or operational framework. Conducting a multitude of diverse missions can be simple, with clear strategic or operational guidance.

⁷² Bradbury and Kleinman.

⁷³ Lee and Farrell.

Table 1. Perceived Civil Affairs Missions

Military	Humanitarian	Other
Countering Violent Extremism	Project evaluation and assessments	Combating the effects of Colonialism
On the ground information	Community assistance	Show host community that Americans are good people
Access and Information		Continue what the other team did
MI-Mil support		

Source: Jessica Lee and Maureen Farrell, “A Study of Civil Affairs in East Africa. Nov 2009-Jul 2010” (U.S. Africa Command Knowledge Development, September 2010), 3.

Dr. Burgess also questioned if CA Soldiers understood the strategic importance of their mission. His study found that CA was CJTF-HOA’s primary instrument as they explored their mission in the undergoverned areas within their AOR. In 2005, CA ramped up their activity in a campaign to win hearts and minds in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. The CJTF-HOA CA teams developed infrastructure programs to improve the quality of life in the pastoral regions. The campaign would supposedly win Somali hearts and minds for the U.S. and HoA states, and lessen support for violent extremists, including Al-Qaeda. The aim was to win over Somalis in Ethiopia’s Ogaden—Somali Region and Kenya’s North East Province and thereby to have an effect inside Somalia, because there are clan linkages across borders. Another aim was to build rapport between Ethiopian and Kenyan authorities and their Somali populations.

Despite this strategic guidance, Burgess found that the CA teams demonstrated a deficiency in strategic knowledge and perspective, in its approach to countering violent extremism and assisting with sustainable development. The mistakes made by CA teams in Kenya, Ethiopia, and elsewhere reveal a deficiency in strategic knowledge and

perspective in assisting with sustainable development, generating good will, and helping to build African CA units.

None of this data should disparage the efforts conducted by the CA teams themselves. All studies show that the CA teams executed the missions that they thought correct, based on their assessments. Jessica Piombo, provided a CA team perspective on the problems in the HoA. She articulated the challenges of CA teams who constantly seek to make a difference on the ground, but struggle to synchronize their efforts with the efforts of the U.S. Embassy, higher headquarters. As a result, the CA teams will execute the missions that they understand or they feel are necessary, without ensuring that they are nested within an overarching campaign plan.⁷⁴ While the idea of “doing good” is admirable, CA activities without strategic context can quickly become a game of battleship; random strikes across a blank board with minimal hope of success.

The operational approach sets the stage for operational course of action development. It appears that the elements of operational approach existed in the HoA campaign, without the proper course of action development or necessary direction given to the CA teams. The individual missions received by the CA teams were not vague or contradictory; they were elements of the operational approach for the HoA. The case studies suggest that the CA Team Leaders were either uninformed or uneducated on how their individual missions supported the campaign endstate. It also suggests that, given their role in coordinating with DoS, CA Soldiers should be more comfortable in describing the operational approach rather than merely their mission. It is more vital that

⁷⁴ Piombo.

a CA team is able to articulate the purpose of its activities, rather than describing what activities are being performed.

Given the inability of the CA teams to understand the campaign objectives, the primary role of CA quickly became, doing good, or giving the people what they needed. This becomes very problematic when working with DoS or other IA partners. Those organizations operate on planned programs that support the Embassy Mission Strategic and Resource Plan. The giving and receiving relationship, created by CA Soldiers doing good, hinders the effectiveness of any one program.⁷⁵

The other primary role that CA forces assumed was tactical access to local populations. Because of the ability of CA to gain and maintain access to isolated population bases, they became very valuable to the CJTF-HOA.⁷⁶ However, failure to mature this access beyond the mere tactical success had eventual negative implications. First, when CA merely focused on providing access for other military and Intelligence personnel, their efforts caused severe suspicion. It is not difficult to understand that if every time a CA team arrives at a region, followed by the arrest of a VEO leader, people will distrust the intentions of the CA Soldiers. While short-term tactical access is vital, a CA team can be more successful if they focus on maintaining long-term emplacement over short-term access.

⁷⁵ Lee and Farrell.

⁷⁶ Bradbury and Kleinman.

Vulnerability Assessments

A problematic method used by CA to assess the source of vulnerabilities in the HoA was the method of inquiry and request. Assessments describe issues and limitations in order to obtain future possible DoD or DoS support and are a major component of the military decision-making process. CA teams often begin and end their tours with assessments. Observation of several teams by multiple studies showed that one of the CA team's major modes of interaction with community members was to simply ask what the communities needed; they then referred to this process as "assessments."

As they interacted with local community members and other stakeholders, the key leader engagement typically ended with a question of "What do you need?" Studies show that repeated assessment visits and meetings centered on community needs bring false expectations, fatigue within the community, and limits the kinds of relationships CA personnel can build with local leaders. Through the process of asking about the needs of a particular school or community, a CA team's relationship is restricted to an interaction based on giving and receiving.

Finally, this questionable approach to assessments lacks synchronization with DoD or any other IA/NGO source. This form of assessments may work to develop local relationships, but it will damage long-term development. This was a problem identified in interviews with local stakeholders and State Department professionals, as well as by CA team members themselves. This is particularly true in East Africa and the HoA, where international donors, NGOs, and other actors are all working in the same areas as CA teams. CA teams face the difficult task of finding that careful balance between the competing interests of staying connected and building relationships, with their ability to

deliver resources or maintain sustainable projects to a community.⁷⁷ By utilizing the simple Army assessment methods the CA teams were unable to grasp the large sources of instability. When the CA teams failed to use consistent assessment tools, they produced different outcomes, which led to a loss of trust among the other stakeholders in the HoA.

Just as the lack of initial assessments hindered the DoD ability to accurately understand the problems in the HoA, the lack of post project assessments hindered CA ability to understand the effect of their programs. In 2010, the U.S. GAO conducted a congressionally directed study into the effectiveness of the DoD and CA activities in the HoA. Their report focused on the lack of CA programs nested within strategic goals, and lack of long-term assessments to determine if CA projects were effective.

During a GAO visit to the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia, they learned of several project proposals from CA teams deployed in the country, ranging from under \$10,000 to about \$200,000—including the construction of a teaching farm, school renovations, training for local mechanics, construction of an orphanage, and renovation of a bridge. In some instances, CJTF-HOA had conducted short-term follow up on activities. While these reports may be important measures of the immediate results of activities, the consensus among AFRICOM, CJTF-HOA, and U.S. Embassy personnel that long-term follow up on CJTF-HOA's activities generally did not occur. For example, a CJTF-HOA embassy liaison official told the GAO that CA teams might follow up on past activities if still deployed to the area in which the activity occurred, but there was no requirement for

⁷⁷ Lee and Farrell.

the teams to return to the area for the sole purpose of evaluating the activities effectiveness.⁷⁸

There are several assessment tools that could have been used in this situation. The CA teams did use simple tools, such as, the Military's Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events (also known as ASCOPE) to determine both the current, and post programs.⁷⁹ The U.S. Institute for Peace also developed a guide to determine what needs to be accomplished; this guide is called the "Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction." These principles emerged from a comprehensive review of major strategic policy documents from State Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Development, along with major intergovernmental organizations and NGOs.⁸⁰ The purpose of these principles is to outline the desired outcome from the host nation and international actors perspective. It then provides guidelines on how to achieve that endstate, based on best practices. It is not sponsored by any U.S. agency, but provides guidance based on the efforts of multiple agencies worldwide.

A final tool that could have been used to conduct assessments is the Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF). Developed by USAID, the CAF is a systematic process to analyze and prioritize the dynamics of peace, conflict, stability, and instability in a given country context. Conflict assessment is the first step in formulating strategies, developing policies, and designing programs that effectively prevent, mitigate, and

⁷⁸ Government Accountability Office, GAO 10-504, *Defense Management*.

⁷⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014).

⁸⁰ United States Institute for Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2009).

manage conflict dynamics. Working in close cooperation with DoS missions, the USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation conducts assessments using the CAF.⁸¹ The most important consideration when conducting an assessment is accuracy. However, the reports showed that a lack of consistency in CA reporting resulted in a loss of trust from the embassy staff. The CAF provides a framework that will enhance the accuracy of the assessments, support consistent reporting, while also assisting in synchronizing DoD and DoS programs.

Information Collection

The CA value to the CJTF-HOA was in their ability to gain and maintain access to isolated populations. CA ability to analyze the vulnerabilities and begin programs to address those vulnerabilities can be monumental. However, if the CA teams do not capture the information, and accurately analyze the population, they lose their value to DoD, SOF, and the CJTF as well. This is what occurred in the HoA as teams tried to fulfill the needs of the populace and failed to conduct proper and thorough assessments. This created a common operating picture lacking in accuracy and clarity.⁸² As teams rotated in and out of theater, they struggled to accurately share information between each other. Each study demonstrated a lack of shared understanding or information.

⁸¹ US Agency for International Development, *Conflict Assessment Framework Application Guidance* (Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, 2012).

⁸² Piombo.

A core task of CA is CIM. The CA teams should have been able to capture Civil Information and store it at the CJTF level for future use. This lack of understanding led to GEN Carter Ham's decision to decrease the role of CA in 2011.⁸³

DoS Synchronization

All of the studies on the HoA answer the secondary research question: what were the challenges to CA supporting both DoS and DoD Objectives? There are several responses to this question. First is the question of who is the supporting or supported organization. Dr. Burgess describes this challenge when outlining the clash of interests in a Title 10 and Title 22 environment. DoD, who utilizes Title 10 authority to combat terrorism, has been constrained by having to operate in a "Title 22 zone" where U.S. Ambassadors can veto the plans of combatant commanders and which prevents the military from carrying out anything more robust than a containment strategy. This constraint prevents DoD from demonstrating strategic knowledge and perspective.⁸⁴ The studies show that when DoD and DoS can collaborate and synchronize their activities, the results are much more effective than when DoS and DoD operate independent of each other.⁸⁵

The CA teams could have transcended tactical success if they had focused on increased synchronization with the DoS MSRP. In a few instances, the DoS maintained its lead role in countering violent extremism and reconstituting the state in Somalia. As a

⁸³ Burgess.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Petit.

result, the military adjusted its role and became a supporting actor in the sustainable development field and in Somalia in countering Al Shabaab, by helping to build a state and military. In these cases, the efforts of DoD and CA was successful. Instead of randomly building development infrastructure, CA teams focused using their access to expand the DoS footprint; this was very successful.⁸⁶ However, it appears that the CA teams that worked to expand DoS influence were rare. Most of the CA supported DoD or CJTF objectives alone. The result was a clash of interests and therefore the CA teams were largely incapable of enabling the DoS Mission.

Table 2 is a list of the strategic priorities taken from the DoS strategic plan for Africa. At first glance, there are multiple points where DoS synchronization should have been routine. For example, a CA team that is gaining access to an isolated population for DoD purposes can easily nest that mission with the DoS priority of counter-terrorism. With a little more coordination and relationship building, that same mission to gain access can support multiple DoS missions. A CA team gaining Civil Information on an isolated population group can also conduct assessments supporting post-conflict reconstruction, or human rights initiatives. The studies do not show this level of synchronization. On the contrary, the studies show that the CA teams were unable to synchronize their activities with DoS priorities. If the CA teams were able to nest their missions within both DoS and DoD objectives, it would have enhanced the synchronization and interoperability of both DoD and DoS activities.

⁸⁶ Burgess.

Table 2. 2007-2012 DoS Africa Strategic Priorities

DoS Africa Strategic Priorities
Support post-conflict reconstruction
Democracy and Human Rights
Counterterrorism
Promoting Economic Growth
Providing Humanitarian Assistance

Source: Department of State, *FY 2007-2012 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan*, accessed 1 October 2014, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2007/>.

The second challenge to DoS synchronization is the education of CA Soldiers. Because CA Soldiers are not aid workers, their efforts are often uninformed. Despite the desire of CJTF-HOA to adopt a development portion of the mission, there are several glaring problems with the process of delivering humanitarian and development assistance that only help DoD achieve its objectives.⁸⁷ Whatever the technical skills of the reservists who make up the CA teams, they do not necessarily have the requisite skills or knowledge to undertake community development work. While Reserve CA teams consist of Functional Specialists, this is no guarantee that they have the specialty needed for the given problem. There also appears to be a significant reach back problem; a CA team, lacking the skills to deal with a significant water infrastructure problem, cannot simply call back to the U.S. for an expert.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ US Agency for International, Office of Military Affairs, *Civilian-Military Operations Guide*, V 2.2, July 2011.

⁸⁸ Bradbury and Kleinman.

The lack of education on the part of the CA teams is highlighted further by their lack of training. All of the studies show that CA professionals need training appropriately tailored to peacetime environments and instruction on how the military coordinates and cooperates with the different departments and agencies of the USG.⁸⁹ When asked what kind of training they wish they had had, CA team members identified the following: project nomination cycles, construction management, funding and authorities, conflict negotiation and mediation, among others. Most often, CA team members stated that they would have liked more practice role playing scenarios with local community members, DoS, and NGO partners.⁹⁰

Generally speaking, CA teams frustrated DoS employees because of perceptions that the CA teams lacked understanding of strategic goals. CA seemed unprepared for the implications of their high level of visibility as they operated in the field. They failed to clearly understand how their efforts support the USG's whole of government approach in their respective countries. Finally, CA teams lacked the ability to articulate how their construction projects or Humanitarian Assistance activities tied into the DoS campaign plan.⁹¹

It is important to highlight the difference in training received by Reserve CA and Active CA Soldiers. There is an expectation that Reserve CA Soldiers will all be Functional Specialists, capable of filling vital roles in governance because of their civilian occupation. This is not always the case. Most of the CA Soldiers in the HoA were

⁸⁹ Government Accountability Office, GAO 10-504, *Defense Management*.

⁹⁰ Burgess.

⁹¹ Lee and Farrell.

Police Officers or associated with the Justice Department. Precious few were water purification specialists, sociologists, or other specialties that would have promoted DoS interests in the HoA.⁹²

Active CA Soldiers attend a 49-week Qualification course. Each soldier is selected and assessed for his-her ability to think critically and operate in ambiguous circumstances. During their course, they receive training on multiple aspects of CA Operations and additionally focuses its efforts on understanding the National, Strategic, and Operational environments, collaborating with DoS and IA partners, as well as extensive negotiation and mediation training. This is tested through multiple practical exercises, and finally in the Culminating Exercise, Operation SLUSS-TILLER.

Reserve CA Soldiers receive a 30-day condensed course. They receive a large portion of their basic training through distance learning but can never replicate the level of training received by an Active Soldier. Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, the training concerns are noted, but also highlight the disposition of the soldier. Not all CA Soldiers receive equivalent training, and therefore should not be expected to conduct equivalent mission sets. However, commanders and ambassadors who requested CA in their Areas of Responsibility expected all of their CA assets to be able to perform equitably.

The final challenge to the synchronization of DoS and DoD objectives is the deployment limit and Rules of Engagement, often placed on DoD soldiers. CA teams rotate every year or less, while diplomacy, development, and defense officials in the US Embassies rotate every three years. In contrast, relatively stable and mature

⁹² Piombo.

organizations, such as the embassies, with leaders who are held accountable, are better able to learn and change in an ambiguous environment.⁹³ To compound this, DoD employees in the HoA were often required to maintain the same level of force protection required in combat zones. This only served to build further distrust between the DoD and DoS, who were not under those restrictions.⁹⁴

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, CA was very successful in gaining access to isolated populations. What the CA teams in the HoA were unable to accomplish effectively was to enable DoS objectives in those isolated regions. That is the only way that they could have begun the transformation from undergoverned to a governed territory. The CA teams struggled in conducting assessments that were compatible with the DoS and could justify their continued presence; this led to a critical moment for CA teams in the HoA. In 2008, the US Embassy in Nairobi removed all CA teams from the Mandera Triangle. Afterwards, the Kenyan Government asked the CJTF-HOA CA teams to leave the North East Province altogether. Therefore, sensitivities of the two most important stake holders in the HoA, as well as those of skeptical U.S. officials, removed CJTF-HOA and its CA activities in the most strategic areas. Because CA could not justify their worth to the DoS, they decreased in value to both the DoS and the DoD.

Horn of Africa Summary

Despite their ability to provide short-term access to the CJTF, the CA forces struggled in the HoA. The GCC, DoS, and host nation limiting CA activities due to

⁹³ Burgess.

⁹⁴ Bradbury and Kleinman.

inadequate results are the evidence for these struggles. Primarily, the study conducted by Dr. Burgess suggests that the CJTF-HoA Commanders requested a CA capability aligned with the CME program but received Reserve CA teams trained to conduct post-conflict recovery and apply functional specialty expertise. The CA teams were hindered by their inability to understand the operational approach to achieving strategic goals. Every CME member should have received the education necessary to link their tactical actions to strategic objectives. The lack of training and education on DoS procedures, and lack of synchronization with DoS programs also led the Reserve CA teams to develop programs that were inadequate and unsustainable. Furthermore, it damaged relations between DoD and DoS in the HoA. Finally, but likely a result of their inadequate education and training, CA teams in the HoA lacked the framework to assess, capture, and analyze civil vulnerabilities and information. All of these factors led to a decreased role for CA in the undergoverned areas in the HoA.

Pakistan

Mission and Primary Role

Over the past 60 years, Pakistan has been unable to establish control across its geographical boundaries and many areas within Pakistan remain ungovernable. There are many different reasons for lack of governance in Pakistan. In some cases, non-state actors have developed their own governance structure, emerging as alternate power centers that supersede the role of the state. The main areas in Pakistan that exhibit this are the FATA,

Baluchistan, and the Southern Punjab.⁹⁵ This falls into the first tenant of ungovernability, defined earlier in this thesis as lack of internal government penetration.

Pakistan has also magnified the governance problem through the use of excessive violence. The second tenant of undergoverned areas warns of the negative consequence of using force as the only means of control. The Pakistani Frontier Crimes Regulation is notorious for its repressive features against people in the FATA region. This empowers the government to arrest anyone, without specifying crime, and permits unilateral punishment of family or tribe for those crimes.⁹⁶ These regulations replaced the need for governance with imposed security, and these regulations have only empowered the VEOs who seek to exploit government vulnerabilities. Organizations such as Al-Qaida provide the people in those undergoverned territories protection against government suppression and in return receive support and a safe haven to grow.⁹⁷

The mission of the CA team in Pakistan, in 2007 and again in 2009, was to gain and maintain access into the FATA areas of Pakistan. Based on interviews with the CA Team Leader and SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander, the 2007 mission was specifically to identify those VEO networks in the FATA region and conduct FID with the Frontier Corps. The Frontier Corps were a local, paramilitary group that operated in the FATA region. They were seen as more legitimate in the eyes of the populace than the Pakistani Army, therefore they were the logical choice for SOF partnership.

⁹⁵ Interservices Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and Ministry of the Interior), Rawalpindi and Islamabad, January 2005. Rabasa et al.

⁹⁶ Rumi.

⁹⁷ Rabasa et al.

The CA teams were very successful at gaining access into those regions. They utilized humanitarian actions and CA programs to build initial relations with the local governance. The SOF element, which also consisted of Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Intel personnel were able to capitalize on these relationships by conducting their FID mission. This is how the SOF element maintained access into those “named areas of interest.” While the CA team contributed to the FID mission, their primary value was in their ability to gain access into the targeted regions, and build the relationships necessary for future efforts.

In 2009, the country team relationship began to change. The U.S Ambassador, the Honorable Anne Patterson began to question the effectiveness of the SOF’ programs. Specifically, she did not understand how these activities, conducted in the FATA region, supported the programs outlined in her MSRP. As a result, she began discussions with Special Operations Command Central to remove SOF from the FATA regions and possibly from Pakistan. Recognizing this shift, the SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander changed his approach to this problem.

Because SOF activities were not nested with DoS objectives, the SOCFWD Commander requested that the CA Team Leader from 2007, be redeployed to Pakistan. The new mission was to work in the U.S. Embassy, and deliberately link SOF activities in the FATA region with the programs found in the MSRP. SOCFWD-Pakistan chose this leader because of the working relationships that had been developed with USAID employees in 2007.⁹⁸ In 2007, the team leader had worked with USAID extensively, but

⁹⁸ SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander 2009, interview.

typically, USAID supported CA programs. In 2009, the roles were reversed and CA began to support the USAID and DoS programs.⁹⁹

This reversal soon proved extremely effective. CA teams in the FATA regions remained focused on gaining access to undergoverned areas in Pakistan and SOF was still able to capitalize on this access to conduct their FID and Intelligence operations. However, all of the CA programs focused, not only on building the legitimacy of the local governance, but on spearheading DoS support to host nation governance efforts. The long-term impacts of this was the Pakistani central government was able to assume the lead on governance, humanitarian, and security activities in the FATA region.¹⁰⁰

Vulnerability Assessments

Just as the teams in the HoA, the Pakistani CA teams did not have a prescribed or consistent way of conducting vulnerability assessments or CR. The method used in 2007 was almost identical to the methods used in the HoA. They simply asked the leaders what they needed or what the issues in the FATA were. As seen in the HoA, this method is not preferred, and can lead to inaccurate assessments, lack of DoS synchronization, and provides SOF with a poor sample of Civil Information. The security situation in Pakistan provided additional constraints, as the CA team was often unable to gain access into the FATA region and identify what essential services or basic needs were required.

When the CA team in Pakistan tried to gain access into the FATA region, they would first identify the basic need of the area. These basic needs are typically not the

⁹⁹ USAID-OTI Deputy Director Pakistan 2007-2010, interview.

¹⁰⁰ CA TL in Pakistan 2007 and 2009, interview.

cause of the local instability, but a secondary symptom. For example, a lack of food was not the reason that insurgents were able to operate out of the FATA region. A lack of food, combined with the added perception that the Pakistani Government was prejudiced against the FATA region is what allowed the insurgents to gain strength. However, unless the team addresses the immediate concern of food, they will not be able to assess the perception of inadequate governance. For the initial, basic description of needs, the CA team relied on local information without verifying the needs themselves.¹⁰¹

Despite using similar assessment methods as the teams in the HoA, the teams in Pakistan did not experience the same failures as seen in the HoA; there are two main reasons for this. First, the team in Pakistan recognized the difference between needs and sources of instability. Second, the emphasis on DoS synchronization was significantly higher in Pakistan than in the HoA. The initial access gained by teams in the HoA and Pakistan was great, but only in Pakistan were the teams able to capitalize on that access.

The SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander stated that the CA team's ability to gain access into a targeted region was the most significant capability that they possessed. However, the Commander also directed that they utilize the access gained to identify the source of the insurgent growth, develop governance programs, and expand into neighboring regions.¹⁰² Therefore, the information gathered by the initial assessment supported local access to the local leadership and demonstrated good will. They were not used to develop the bigger, more costly programs as seen in the HoA; they were used as a basis to provide food or medicine. The most significant example of this was when the

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander 2009, interview.

team, needing to gain access into an area where information was limited, conducted a wheat drive. During this wheat drive, the team was able to meet all of the local governance and militia leaders. They followed-up on this meeting by conducting more thorough assessments in the area.

The CA team purchased their wheat from the USAID office in Pakistan. They had a good relationship with them at the tactical level which facilitated daily interactions. This relationship also helped the CA team conduct assessments on the sources of instability. As USAID had long-term interests in the FATA region, the CA team consulted them regularly. USAID provided a validation of the initial assessments and helped direct the subsequent assessments. When the SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander asked the CA Team Leader to return in 2009 and work in the embassy, this relationship matured. The CA teams began using the USAID assessments because they provided a better framework than any existing product. Additionally, by using these assessments, the CA team could conduct the initial preparations for expanding USAID programs into the FATA regions.¹⁰³ By the end of 2009, all CA programs utilized the USAID assessment as an information basis, and both DoS and SOCFWD concurred with their findings.¹⁰⁴

Information Collection

The SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander stated that gathering Civil Information and building a Common Operating Picture is a basic expectation for all CA teams. This includes identifying the human and physical infrastructure, and participating in the

¹⁰³ USAID-OTI Deputy Director Pakistan 2007-2010, interview.

¹⁰⁴ CA TL in Pakistan 2007 and 2009, interview.

targeting process. The CA teams in Pakistan met these expectations and then some. This Civil Information was invaluable when developing a FID program with the Frontier Corps. They would not have been able to identify the key militia leaders without the information gathered. Likewise, the targeting, both lethal and non-lethal, relied on Civil Information to create their targeting packets.¹⁰⁵

The CA Team Leader stated that gathering this information was one of the greatest challenges. The teams received some training in this, but it did not appear adequate.¹⁰⁶ Each CA Soldier, when working in an isolated area is a key sensor; he or she comes in daily contact with thousands of people. They travel through areas of the country that are typically unpermissive or denied regions. If these soldiers cannot capitalize on their access, the access, the relationships built, and the time expended becomes wasted.¹⁰⁷ While the SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander said that the information gathered was one of the greatest contributions of CA, the team leader recognized that they could have provided so much more, given the access they obtained.

The SOF element utilized the Distributed Common Ground System-Army program of record as a method of capturing and analyzing their Civil Information. The CA team utilized ArcGeographic Information System computer software, and USAID—DoS used Google Earth to capture their information. Despite these software differences, the team leader did not think that software was a significant challenge to information collection. The team leader realized that SOF required information that answered their

¹⁰⁵ SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander 2009, interview.

¹⁰⁶ CA TL in Pakistan 2007 and 2009, interview.

¹⁰⁷ SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander 2009, interview.

gaps and requirements. USAID and the embassy required information that supported their MSRP and addressed their programs and indicators. The conclusion of the team leader was that it was more significant to understand the requirements of the various agencies and plan missions that addressed them, than to try to utilize a specific type of software. This provided the flexibility to address both DoS and SOF information requirements. Being trained to plan a CR mission, maximize the access gained by effectively serving as an information sensor, and reporting the information accurately and in a manner applicable to the requirement, is the most important aspects of information collection.

DoS Synchronization

The SOF element always maintained a good relationship with USAID and DoS. They purchased wheat from them, worked with their implementing partners, and respected their capabilities. However, as the SOF mission began to mature the U.S. Ambassador required more coordination. In 2009 the Ambassador had two main concerns with the SOF mission. First, she described their missions as “chasing a thousand points of light;” the SOF mission appeared to lack cohesiveness or a systematic program. Second, she believed that programs and humanitarian missions should only be focused on development. She did not believe that development programs could support both SOF and DoS objectives. She requested an inquiry to evaluate the effectiveness of CA and SOF missions.

The SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander responded by requesting that the CA Team Leader return to fill a permanent position in the U.S. Embassy. The team leader’s job was to synchronize SOF and DoS objectives, and highlight SOF commitment to achieving long-term governance in the FATA. This coordination included weekly meetings, led by

DoS that ensured cooperation between all the embassy agencies. In these meetings, the CA Team Leader would share Civil Information and assessments in order to demonstrate the source of the instability. If the U.S. Ambassador concurred, she would then direct DoS or USAID assets towards addressing those threats.¹⁰⁸ Using DoS assessment tools helped describe the problem and justify the source of the information.¹⁰⁹ This created an environment where CA served as the initial agents that directly spearheaded long-term governance programs into targeted undergoverned regions. Long-term, according to the SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander, this was the most important aspect of the CA mission and is what led to the increase of Pakistani government legitimacy in the FATA.¹¹⁰ The study conducted by the New America Foundation concurred with this assessment and concluded that it would be key for future success in Pakistan.¹¹¹

Pakistan Summary

At first glance, there are more similarities between the HoA and Pakistani missions than differences. Both teams focused on gaining access for SOF forces, and both teams were very successful at it. Both teams conducted programs that addressed the immediate needs of the people. The lack of consistent vulnerability assessment tools and information collection tools were shared in both regions as well. Finally, the effectiveness of CA programs were questioned in both locations by DoS. There is no longer a SOF

¹⁰⁸ CA TL in Pakistan 2007 and 2009, interview.

¹⁰⁹ USAID-OTI Deputy Director Pakistan 2007-2010, interview.

¹¹⁰ SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander 2009, interview.

¹¹¹ Fishman.

mission in either Pakistan or HoA. The mission in Pakistan was, however, a resounding success. SOF departed the FATA region, because the Pakistani Government had increased its presence and the people perceived their government in a positive manner. While there are many locations in the FATA that still provide haven for insurgents, SOF were able to target a significant number. They also created an environment where the militia groups were trained and included in the government. CA was considered, by both USAID and SOCFWD, as essential in creating this environment.

The CA team overcame many of the challenges that hindered the teams in the HoA by placing an emphasis on synchronization with DoS. In 2007, USAID supported the CA programs by providing them with assistance, material support, and institutional guidance. While the CA programs did not support existing DoS programs, there was a working relationship between DoS and SOF. In 2009, SOF shifted their focus from gaining access, to acting as a conduit for DoS support to local governance. The CA Team Leader assumed a permanent position in the embassy and worked to ensure DoS/SOF collaboration; this proved critical to the eventual success.

The DoS/SOF synchronization also proved to be the most effective way of conducting assessments and identifying the sources of instability. Initially the team was able to conduct unilateral assessments, but sharing assessments metrics with DoS enabled synchronization and smoother execution. Finally, the information gathered by the CA team was critical to the SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander and necessary for DoS expansion. The team in Pakistan found success by focusing on gathering information that met specific Intelligence requirements, as well as addressing DoS information gaps. They deemphasized the software used and the methodology of storing the data.

Ultimately, the CA efforts in Pakistan validates the proposal of this thesis. The CA team utilized essential services to gain access into targeted undergoverned areas. They capitalized on this access by conducting CR and assessments to build the Common Operating Picture and identify the insurgent networks. In this manner, they directly supported the achievement of SOF objectives. However, the CA programs provided the greatest support to SOF by serving as a vanguard for DoS support to governance. This is what truly allowed government programs to penetrate society, to the point that insurgencies no longer found an easy safe haven in the FATA.

Sri Lanka

Mission and Primary Role

Conflict in Sri Lanka has been extensive through the 19th and 20th centuries and originates from the dissatisfaction of the Tamil minority. While Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2009, large portions of the country remain capable of returning to violence. The Sri Lankan Government is mitigating this threat by ensuring a strong Sri Lankan Military presence throughout Northern Sri Lanka. This approach provides security, but does not address the root causes of conflict.¹¹² Using the definition of undergoverned territories, the northern portions of Sri Lanka remain undergoverned because the Sri Lankan Government has still failed to penetrate northern society, other than with military force. This leaves many pockets where the Tamil minority remains suppressed; the victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam may be short lived.

¹¹² Hashim.

The CA mission was to enter those undergoverned territories in order to identify, mitigate, and-or reduce civil vulnerabilities caused by instability. The CA teams focused on those vulnerabilities exploited by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; this was in support of SOCPAC objectives. The SOCPAC Commander and the US Ambassador to Sri Lanka sought to gain visibility in areas of Sri Lanka that had been previously occupied by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Their goal was to work with the Sri Lankan Government and military forces to engage the civilian populace, identify critical vulnerabilities, and promote stability in line with U.S. strategic interests.¹¹³

This CA team received the same mission given to all CA teams, including the teams in the HoA: “Go to Sri Lanka and conduct CA operations.”¹¹⁴ As observed in the HoA case, CA can struggle with the complexities of such a vague mission statement. However, the CA team in Sri Lanka did not struggle to the same extent as the teams in the HoA. This was due primarily to the education received during PMT and the synchronization of efforts conducted at SOCPAC.

During PMT, each of the CA teams focused on understanding the strategic importance of their mission sets. While the teams received the standard training of force protection, physical fitness, counter-surveillance, and the like, most of the training time was spent understanding the NSS, the Sri Lankan MSRP, and USAID objectives. CA Soldiers conducting this PMT internalized the understanding that every CA program must first support SOCPAC objectives, in a SOCPAC area of interest, for the specific

¹¹³ CA Team Leader in Sri Lanka 2009, telephonic interview by author, 2 December 2014.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

purpose of maintaining long-term emplacement in those regions and supporting the host nation government. Just as importantly, each CA team learned the importance of conducting CA activities in a collaborative effort with both the DoS and USAID.¹¹⁵

While the preparation and planning for this CA mission was common to all CA teams, the Sri Lankan CA Team Leader was given a unique mission. This tasking was to serve as the SOCPAC Military Liaison Element lead. This element facilitates all of the SOF powers working together to accomplish SOF objectives. In a mature mission, this position would typically be a Special Forces Officer because of his additional education and training. The remaining members of this element are an Operations Officer, a Civil Military Support Element, and a Military Information Support Team. This element would also be augmented by an Intelligence specialist.

In Sri Lanka, the U.S. Ambassador did not want to bring this entire element into her AOR; having Special Forces members in Sri Lanka made the ambassador and her staff uncomfortable. This can be typical given the reputation of Special Forces Soldiers derived from war movies and stories. Special Forces Soldiers are capable of conducting any mission, but their status can hinder their ability to gain access. However the CA team possessed the ability to provide Humanitarian Assistance and enhance the DoS mission. This ability, combined with the fact that CA Soldiers are not Special Forces Soldiers, caused the ambassador to grant access to the CA team. The team, consisting of two people, was the only SOF element that was permitted into Sri Lanka and its undergoverned territories. SOCPAC, understanding the value of establishing a SOF

¹¹⁵ This information was obtained by the authors knowledge of the PMT cycle. The author conducted PMT with the Sri Lanka Civil Affairs team in 2009.

presence in Sri Lanka, gave the CA team the additional mission of acting as the element lead and working to expand the SOF presence in that area of interest.¹¹⁶

Vulnerability Assessments

As with the other CA teams researched, the Sri Lankan CA team did not have a specific tool or metric by which to conduct assessments. Drawing on past experiences and training, the CA Team Leader conducted on the spot assessments to identify what the vulnerabilities and capability gaps were. As seen in the HoA case study, a lack of established assessment tools can be extremely problematic, and can degrade the value of the Civil Information and CA programs. In fact, the only reason that the team in Sri Lanka did not struggle as the HoA team did, was by utilizing tools and frameworks provided by the DoS and its implementing NGOs.

One example of this tool was the Health Facility Assessment provided by the Defense Attaché's Office. This tool allowed the team leader to conduct an assessment in a manner that the U.S. Embassy could understand. In a similar fashion, he utilized the USAID Field Operating Guide and specific NGO tools to categorize and analyze the vulnerabilities. Utilizing these tools helped the CA team maintain trust and credibility with DoS and the U.S. Embassy staff. However, the team leader still regretted not having a more established framework to synchronize SOF and DoS activities more effectively.

Since his deployment, the CA Team Leader has served as a Civil Military Operations Chief and a Company Commander. During these experiences, he became aware of the CAF described in the HoA review. Unequivocally, he said that he would

¹¹⁶ CA Team Leader in Sri Lanka 2009, interview.

have been more effective in accomplishing his mission if he had used the CAF during his deployment. Not only would he have had a formal and complete methodology for assessing and analyzing vulnerabilities, he would have a common tool to share the results of his assessments with the U.S. Embassy. One specific instance that he shared involved a mission to provide Humanitarian Assistance and enhance the DoS mission in Northern Sri Lanka. A misunderstanding of the CA team's purpose in the region caused some members of USAID to question the motive of the CA team.¹¹⁷ This lack of trust can be expected between DoD and DoS or USAID, but can be mitigated or reduced through the use of a common assessment framework.

Information Collection

One of the greatest capabilities the CA team possessed was their ability to gain access to otherwise unpermissive areas. They were able to do this because of their military training and background, combined with their humanitarian mission. The Sri Lankan CA team built effective relationships with the NGOs and DoS and as a result used those relationships to gain access into undergoverned territories. This relationship was strengthened because the CA team was able to gather Civil Information from those undergoverned territories and provide that information back to DoS and the NGOs. This relationship was mutually beneficial to both SOF and DoS—NGOs and allowed the CA teams access throughout most of the country. This CA capability was so valuable that the team leader attributed all of his success to the quality information he provided to SOCPAC and the U.S. Embassy.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

The access provided by the CA team was prized by SOCPAC just as it was in the HoA. Civil Information provided by the CA teams allowed SOCPAC to plan and execute all of their missions more effectively. The only limitation to this situation was in the CA team's lack of Intelligence training; CA Soldiers are not Intelligence collectors. Their job is not to analyze Intelligence or to actively collect information. However, the Civil Information, if captured properly, can be extremely useful to those in the Intelligence Community. The limitation that the Sri Lankan CA team had was in their ability to effectively communicate Civil Information in a manner that was useful to SOF and Intelligence Communities.¹¹⁸

The CA team in Sri Lanka received excellent training in negotiations, planning and executing key leader engagements, and gathering Civil Information.¹¹⁹ A better understanding of, and synchronization with, the Intelligence Community could augment this training during the planning portion of the mission. This would ensure that each CA mission into an undergoverned territory not only provides SOF and DoS access, but serves as a true reconnaissance mission. During this reconnaissance, the CA teams have planned information requirements that they seek to answer and they write their subsequent reports in a way that is of value to the Intelligence Community and SOF planners.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ B/3/1st SWTG, "CAQC Pipeline."

DoS Synchronization

The SOCPAC Commander, Admiral Sean Pybus, ensured that SOF-DoS collaboration and synchronization was a priority. He directed that each SOF element, deployed into a Title 22 zone, spent two weeks at SOCPAC learning how to synchronize efforts. During these two weeks, each SOF member was briefed on the DoS, CIA, USAID, and other major IA objectives. Planning sessions were conducted to ensure that SOF and DoS efforts were collaborative to the greatest extent possible. This Command direction, combined with the existing PMT ensured that each CA and SOF member understood the significance of DoS/SOF synchronization.¹²⁰

This training and understanding served the Sri Lankan CA team especially well. As the first member of SOF in Sri Lanka, it was essential for him to build trust and relationships with DoS. The team leader understood that this was essentially a “trial run” allowing SOF to operate in a Title 22 zone that was of strategic importance to SOCPAC. As such, the CA team spent the early part of this deployment simply demonstrating how CA and SOF could enhance the DoS mission. They were not challenged when trying to synchronize their efforts with DoS to the same extent as in the HoA. His success was highlighted when the U.S. Ambassador in 2010 recognized the value of SOF to her MSRP and allowed the entire SOF element to operate in Sri Lanka. In this manner, the CA team spearheaded SOF operations into the country of Sri Lanka.

It was vital for the CA Team Leader to demonstrate mission transparency to DoS. If he had attempted to hide his actions from DoS, the U.S. Ambassador would have

¹²⁰ This information was obtained by the author’s knowledge of the PMT cycle. The author conducted PMT with the Sri Lanka Civil Affairs team in 2009.

simply restricted the teams access. Furthermore, the CA team sent to conduct Humanitarian Assistance will never have the expertise found in DoS or USAID; it would be arrogant for the CA team to try and represent humanitarian or governance expertise. It is therefore essential for CA Soldiers to transparently express how they can enhance the DoS mission, while their primary objectives are SOF objectives. However, transparency does not equal full disclosure. The CA Soldier does not have to specifically articulate all aspects of his mission; he or she must, however, share with DoS the SOF objectives and purpose of their mission.

The Sri Lankan CA Team Leader was not provided a tool to assist in the synchronization of DoS and SOF objectives. However, interviews conducted with the CMAG offered a way to enable SOF-DOS synchronization. This tool was developed by the 95th CA Brigade in 2008 and oriented to the SOCPAC region.¹²¹ This tool was used first in mission planning and lists all of the SOF, DoS, and USAID objectives in a specific region. Understanding these objectives allows CA teams to develop operational objectives and programs that will accomplish SOF objectives, while simultaneously supporting DoS and USAID objectives as well. This tool is also an effective method of ensuring that CA programs remain synchronized with DoS and USAID. While a simple tool, its use is effective. This tool is currently introduced during the CAQC and is utilized, to various extents, by the 95th CA Brigade.¹²² However, it is not institutional or listed in any doctrinal document. Figure 7 is an example of this tool.

¹²¹ CMAG Director (2012), Interview by author, Fort Bragg, NC, 17 December 2014.

¹²² This information was gained by the Authors assignment as an instructor at the Civil Affairs Qualification Course.




Figure 7. SOF-DoS Synchronization Tool

Source: B/3/1st SWTG, "CA Methodology: Assess" (Civil Affairs Qualification Brief, February 2015).

Sri Lanka Summary

The CA mission in Sri Lanka was not only a complete success; it also provides an example of how CA can truly spearhead SOF activities in undergoverned territories. The CA Team Leader arrived in Sri Lanka, charged with achieving SOF Objectives. However, his training and education along with the SOCPAC Command directives ensured that he understood the Title 22 environment in which they were working. His successful navigation in this environment built trust with the Ambassador. He was able to

demonstrate his value by ensuring that every one of his programs directly supported a DoS or USAID program. As a result, the Ambassador allowed the entire SOF element to operate in Sri Lanka, thus increasing SOF capability to successfully combat the extremist organizations. The Sri Lanka mission has endured for over five years and is quickly becoming a mature mission in one of SOCPAC's priority regions.

Understanding the strategic importance of the mission in Sri Lanka, and being able to synchronize SOF and DoS activities are the main reasons for the CA Team Leaders success. Like the CA teams in the HoA, the team in Sri Lanka was challenged when conducting assessments. A lack of common framework that could be used to assess the sources of instability and could be understood by DoS, IA, and NGO partners was a challenge. This was mitigated by relationship building and using ad hoc tools, but still hindered the CA team.

Finally, while the CA team was able to provide access for SOF into undergoverned territories and produced a tremendous amount of Civil Information, the team would have benefited from increased synchronization and training. Better synchronization with the Intelligence Community within SOF would have allowed the CA programs to be targeted better. This synchronization would also have allowed for the Intelligence gaps to be filled more effectively. While CA Soldiers are well trained in regards to conducting engagements and gathering Civil Information, better training on report writing would have increased the value of CA reports to the Intelligence Community and the SOF planners. The CA mission to Sri Lanka was extremely successful, but could have been even more effective with these minor enhancements.

Summary

This chapter conducted and outlined the results of the qualitative analysis that was conducted on the CA missions in the HoA, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Each mission had success and failures, but all the studies and interviews provided data in support of the research questions. The data demonstrates that the CA Regiment, specifically the CME program, provides SOF a unique capability to address threats found in undergoverned areas. This is due to its ability to gain and maintain access into those areas by projecting essential services and basic Humanitarian Assistance. Even the CA teams that were less successful in the HoA were able to provide a tremendous amount of short-term access. The more successful CA elements can capitalize on this access by identifying the sources of instability, through detailed civil reconnaissance and vulnerability assessments. However, the greatest value of the CME program is its ability to serve as the vanguard for DoS efforts in assisting host nation governance in order to marginalize terrorist organizations.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the end, it will be these continuous indirect operations (CA/CMSE) that will prove decisive in the global security arena.

— Admiral (Ret) William H. McRaven,
Posture Statement to Congress 2013

Conclusion

It is well documented that ineffective governance creates the conditions for terrorist and extremist organizations to find safe haven and grow in power which jeopardizes global stability and U.S. security. In response, USSOCOM developed a campaign to counter these threats, placing emphasis on legitimizing local governance and mitigating sources of instability that fuel insurgent growth and provides safe haven. Successful accomplishment of all SOF missions requires the synchronization of SOF power. The researcher proposed that the CA Regiment provides a unique capability by which SOF may achieve its long-term objectives in undergoverned areas. The research validated this proposal, but clarified that the CME program is the specific component that achieves SOF objectives.

CA teams in each of the researched regions experienced varying levels of success and failure in support of SOF objectives. Despite the regional differences, the principal cause for success found in Pakistan and Sri Lanka is directly related to the CA team's ability to synchronize their objectives with existing DoS objectives. In Sri Lanka, the CA team made this a key element of their planning process and enjoyed the greatest amount of success. Conversely, the teams in HoA were unable to achieve this unity of effort

resulting in only a few tactical successes. The leadership in Pakistan recognized the potential failure in their tactical focus and adjusted their program to better support long-term DoS objectives.

The conclusion from the research is clear; the CME program is powerful when the CA teams align their programs with DoS objectives. By doing this, they retain their ability to gain access and conduct CIM and enhance the long-term effectiveness of the SOF mission. This is because of their ability to spearhead DoS support to host nation governance in targeted areas. This is the foundation of the long-term approach described in SOCOM's new campaign against insurgent threats. The CME program has the potential to support not just SOF, but all U.S. Army objectives. If endorsed by FORSCOM and Combatant Commanders, the CME program could also enhance the unity of effort between all DoS and DoD activities and support the execution of stability tasks. This may prove significant given the concept of Unified Land Operations and future refinement of the RAF mission.

USASOC has developed two organizations designed to increase SOF-DoS interoperability.¹²³ The first organization is the CMAG, which provides SOF the capability to share information and coordinate activities with DoS. Specifically, the CMAG provides CA teams and Commanders reach back capability to stability experts. This will empower a CA team working in an undergoverned area. The second organization is the IMMSG, which procures, classifies, and deploys civilian expertise in support of stability operations. This is yet another reach back capability that will empower CA teams operating in undergoverned territories. In order to fully capture their

¹²³ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, "ARSOF 2022 Part II."

value to CA, SOF and DoD, the directors of these organizations should publish guides that outline their capabilities and who their partners are. Both of these organizations will increase the value of the CME program.

Despite the potential of the CME program, capability gaps remain which impact the effectiveness of the program. This thesis identifies four of these gaps and makes recommendations to address them. The first capability gap is the Active/ Reserve organizational structure of the CA Regiment. There are doctrinal and educational differences between Active and Reserve CA Soldiers which must be reflected in order to maximize the effectiveness of each segment. The second gap is the institutional synchronization of CA and DoS programs. The researcher recommends simple tools common to both DoS and SOF objectives that will support greater synchronization. The third capability gap identified addresses the misplaced purpose of conducting CIM. Finally, this chapter addresses the education gap described in chapter 3 of this thesis.

Recommendations

Civil Affairs Organization

Because of their training requirements, the researcher recommends that only SOF CA Soldiers perform CME missions to include any that may be adopted by FORSCOM. The draft 2015 USSOCOM Directive 525-38 specifically states that the CME program must be conducted by SOF CA Soldiers.¹²⁴ If approved, the new directive will support this recommendation. However, this is just the first step in conducting accurate troops to

¹²⁴ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Directive 525-38, *Civil Military Engagement*, FY15 draft (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: USSOCOM, September 2014).

task analysis. The researcher further recommends that the CA proponent create a distinct MOS that will distinguish the Reserve CA force from the SOF/Active CA force.

When a commander or ambassador requests a CME in their AOR, they expect a team capable of performing their duties as prescribed by the USSOCOM program of record. However, there is a common misconception among senior Army leaders that all CA Soldiers are trained and educated in a similar fashion and therefore are capable of conducting similar mission sets. The misconception about the CA Regiment exists because all CA Soldiers share the same MOS (38A for Officers and 38B for Non Commissioned Officers) despite receiving different training. The HoA studies demonstrated the negative effects of assigning the wrong CA Soldiers to a CME type mission.

Special Operations Forces-Department of State Synchronization

To maximize the effectiveness of CA teams seeking to spearhead SOF and DoD activities in undergoverned territories, the researcher recommends the CA proponent institutionalize the use of two tools designed to address the most problematic areas of DoS Synchronization: synchronized planning and shared assessments. Once accepted by the CA proponent, these tools may be presented in the upcoming editions of ARSOF 2022 or in Joint Publications 3-05 as ways to enhance DOS/SOF interoperability.

The first recommended tool addresses the gap in SOF-DoS synchronized planning. This planning tool, highlighted in figure 5, assisted the Sri Lanka CA Team Leader when planning his programs. It is a guide that first outlines and seeks similarities between DoS and SOF missions. Using those similarities ensured that the resulting

operational objectives and CA programs accomplished the SOF objectives in a collaborative effort with DoS and USAID objectives. It ensures that DoS synchronization starts in the planning process and is maintained throughout the entire operation.




Figure 8. SOF-DoS Synchronization Tool

Source: B/3/1st SWTG, “CA Methodology: Assess” (Civil Affairs Qualification Brief, February 2015).

Currently, the CAQC presents this tool in its curriculum and some units in the 95th CA Brigade utilize it as well. The researcher recommends that the CA proponent publish this tool as a planning aid for all CA teams that will be operating in a Title 22 zone, or in phase zero operations. If this tool was applied in the HoA, one may synchronize the SOF, CA, and DoS objectives listed in chapter 2 of this thesis. The SOF

objective of countering violent extremism can be nested with the DoS counter-insurgency program which then allows the CA activities to support both programs. Likewise, the CA mission of community assistance could easily nest into the SOF objective of building partner capacity and the DoS objective of supporting post conflict reconstruction. A CA Team Leader, using this tool, will be able to easily synchronize his or her activities with the UAP. This tool will also assist in articulating how the CA activity clearly supports DoS, USAID, and SOF objectives. This transparency was lacking in the HoA and contributed to overall mission failure.

The second recommended tool can also be effective in synchronizing CA activities with DoS programs. This tool is USAID's CAF, developed by USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. The teams in all three regions struggled in their ability to communicate with DoS due to a lack of common vulnerability assessment tools. USAID published a guide to working with the military and one of their top 10 priorities includes a joint CAF tool.¹²⁵ The CAF is the tool, which the CA Team Leader in Sri Lanka learned about after his deployment and wished he had prior knowledge of. It provides a systematic process to analyze and prioritize the dynamics of peace, conflict, stability, and instability in a given country context.

The DoD is familiar with subcomponents of the CAF, such as the District Stability Framework or the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework. Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan have used these tools extensively, and they are a great tool for tactical level

¹²⁵ US Agency for International, Office of Military Affairs, *Civilian-Military Operations Guide*, V 2.2, July 2011.

assessors to gain visibility on sources of instability.¹²⁶ However, because of the strategic importance of undergoverned territories and the higher level of synchronization, the researcher recommends that CA teams use the CAF.

Civil Information Management

The CA Regiment's ability to gain access to undergoverned areas and conduct CR and assessments to map the human domain is one of the capabilities that make CA valuable to commanders. In fact, the SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander listed this capability as the most important capability that the CA Regiment provided. The team leader in Sri Lanka also recognized this capability as the one that made him most valuable to SOCPAC. CA teams in HoA were able to gain access to many of the targeted areas in the region. However, their inability to build a consistent Common Operating Picture and map the human dimension for the commander, led the HoA leadership and the AFRICOM Commander to lose faith in the ability of their CA teams.

The recommendation of the researcher is for the CA proponent to deemphasize the development of software that supports CIM and instead, focus on training and education opportunities offered in the CA training pipeline. The CA teams often spent more effort trying to use a new CIM software system than effort spent gathering information. Information management should not be constrained by software, and analysts should be able to capture information in whatever manner supports the GCC, local Commander or UAP in their respective AOR. Institutionally, CIM should focus on

¹²⁶ US Agency for International, Office of Military Affairs, *Civilian-Military Operations Guide*, V 2.2, July 2011.

two areas: gathering information that supports Intelligence requirements and filling information gaps for DoS and USAID partners.

The research gathered in all three regions describes a lack of education on how to link Civil Information to Intelligence requirements. In 2014, the Special Warfare Advanced Analysis and Targeting Course was developed. This course trains CA Soldiers to apply analytical and targeting frameworks in order to determine critical civil factors and utilize CIM tools, to debrief and synchronize Civil Information in support of the Commanders objectives and a Common Operating Picture. This course is not software focused, but reinforces the training taught during the CAQC, with increased emphasis on analysis.¹²⁷ Specifically, it spends additional time training CA Soldiers on how to plan CR missions and how to synchronize their CR with the Intelligence Community and SOF objectives. This course teaches how to write reports correctly and how to build and maintain a Common Operating Picture. Targeting CA programs with Intelligence requirements was one of the limitations to the CA mission in Sri Lanka. If the CA team had been able to receive the training in this course, they would have been more successful at utilizing all of the information they gathered.

Education and Training

Research from each of the studies on the HoA shows that the training and education received by those CA Soldiers were inadequate for them to be effective. Specifically, the CA teams lacked training in strategic planning, DoS synchronization, SOF interoperability, support to Intelligence operations, and assessments. The Functional

¹²⁷ Correa.

Specialists in the HoA did not possess the specialized expertise that their job description implied. The CA Regiment has received a tremendous amount of feedback on their education pathway. The SOF CA Soldiers have addressed their deficiencies and are improving their course once again, to ensure that they meet both doctrinal direction and commander's expectations. In a similar fashion, the CA proponent should address the deficiencies found in training functional specialists.

Summary

This thesis initially sought to demonstrate that CA is a solution to threats which grow in undergoverned regions. Through the research process, this thesis concludes that this is only partially true. The CME program is the specific CA component that provides SOF, DoD, and national leaders a unique capability when seeking to address threats found in undergoverned areas of the world. Their ability to use essential services, Humanitarian Assistance, and crisis response to gain access into targeted areas is a unique capability. The missions in the HoA, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka demonstrate the value of this access. The CA Regiment's ability to conduct CR, assessments, and information management creates the Common Operating Picture for Commanders and Ambassadors. It sets the conditions for future planning and answers Intelligence requirements. As evidenced in Pakistan, this can provide the greatest tactical or operational value for commanders. However, the CA Regiment's greatest value, to SOF leaders seeking to identify and destroy terrorist safe havens, is its ability to serve as the vanguard for DoS and USAID in support of host nation governance. This long-term process, is the optimal way to eliminate the sanctuaries and resource bases created when non-state terrorist and criminal organizations exploit weak governments.

While the CME program has provided tremendous value to USSOCOM, the potential does not end there. Given the Army's concept of Unified Land Operations, FORSCOM may also benefit from utilizing the CME program in support of GCC objectives. The CME program has a strong potential to benefit the RAF mission if the GCC's choose to fund it through an MFP-2 source. This program may support stability tasks and shape the civil environment but at a minimum, this program is capable of increasing communication between the RAF forces and DoS in their targeted regions. Further research is needed on the CME program's ability to support the RAF and the entire U.S. Army enterprise.

APPENDIX A

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY

You are being asked to take part in a Military Masters of Art and Science research study of how Civil Affairs can spearhead Special Operations Force (SOF) activities in ungoverned territories. This research is being conducted by a student attending the Command and General Staff Officer College (CGSOC). You are asked to take part because you have worked with Civil Affairs Soldiers in ungoverned territories during phase zero operations. Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to take part in the study.

Purpose of the Research Study

The purpose of this study is to record best practices for enhancing the effectiveness of Civil Affairs when conducting SOF activities in ungoverned territories, during phase zero.

Procedures

There will be approximately 20 people asked to take part in this study. If you agree to be in this study, you will be interviewed. The interview will take approximately 30 minutes to complete. The interview will include questions about your experience working with Civil Affairs in ungoverned territories. As a secondary question, you will be asked how Civil Affairs was able to work with State Department in these ungoverned territories. We will not discuss classified information, and you are free to end the interview at any time. In accordance with DoDI 3216.02, *Protection of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in DoD-Supported Research*, all research material will be secured for three years.

Classification and UCMJ:

This thesis and interview will remain unclassified. Please do not provide any classified information in your statements. Do not divulge any information or discuss any situation that may involve a legal or UCMJ violation.

Risks

I do not anticipate any risks to you participating in this study other than those encountered in day-to-day life.

Benefits

This is a research study and there is no expectation that you will receive any direct benefit from participation.

Compensation

This is a research study and you will not receive any compensation from participation.

Confidentiality

1. The records of this study will be kept private. The final thesis will not refer to you by name. Your duty position will be recorded in order to clarify the significance of your interview. The Human Subjects Protection Office or a DoD designee may inspect the records.

2. Every effort will be made to safeguard your confidentiality. There are only a small number of SOF personnel who have worked with Civil Affairs in ungoverned territories. Therefore, the use of your duty position in this thesis may result in an inadvertent loss of your confidentiality. If at any time you become uncomfortable, and want to terminate the interview, you are free to do so and no portion of your interview will be used in this study. You will also be given the opportunity to review and approve your interview notes prior to its use in the study.

3. All data obtained about you, as an individual, will be considered privileged and held in confidence; you will not be identified in any presentation of the results. Complete confidentiality cannot be promised to subjects, particularly to subjects who are military personnel, because information bearing on your health may be required to be reported to appropriate authorities.

Contacts for Additional Assistance

The researcher conducting this study is MAJ Christian Carr. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact MAJ Carr at christian.a.carr.mil@mail.mil or at 919-325-6775. If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this study, you may contact the CGSOC IRB & Human Protections Administrator at maria.l.clark.civ@mail.mil.

Voluntary Participation

Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may skip any questions that you do not want to answer. You will not be penalized in any way if you decide to withdraw from the study at any time. If you decide to take part, you are free to withdraw at any time. I will advise you of any developments during the study that might affect your decision to participate and offer an opportunity to withdraw from the study.

Statement of Consent

I have read this form and its contents were explained. I agree to be in this research study for the purposes listed above. All of my questions were answered to my satisfaction. I will receive a signed and dated copy of this form for my records. This consent form will be kept by the researcher for at least three years beyond the end of the study.

Please check one of the following statements:

☐ You may use my real name when using my data in publications or presentations.

☐ You may not use my real name. However, I realize that others might identify me based on the data, even though my name will not be used.

_____/____/____
Signature of Research Subject **Date**

Printed Name of Research Subject

_____/____/____
Principal Investigator Signature **Date**

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR

SOF AND DoS PERSONNEL

1. What was the CA mission and primary role in undergoverned parts of the researched country?
2. How did CA gain access to an undergoverned area in order to analyse, segment, and map the human terrain? What methods were used to capture and analyse this information?
3. How did CA assess the sources of vulnerabilities that led to the development of the undergoverned territories?
4. Was CA capable of enabling the Department of State (DoS) mission?
5. What were the challenges to CA supporting both DoS and DoD Objectives simultaneously?
6. What were the limitations and capability gaps for CA to serve as the sole DOD representative in an undergoverned area?

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR MSG AND CMAG

1. What are some aspects of your program that will allow CA to support both DoS and DoD Objectives simultaneously?
2. How can CA utilize your programs to enable the Department of State (DoS) mission?

APPENDIX D

SOF AND DoS INTERVIEW RESPONSES

The following questions were asked by the researcher to the following SOF personnel: (Note: to protect their confidentiality, this thesis utilizes the duty position instead of the name.)

CMSE Team Leader, Sri Lanka 2009: Interview conducted on 2 December 2014.

CMSE Team Leader, Pakistan 2007 and 2009: Interview conducted on 17 December 2014.

SOCFWD-Pakistan Commander 2009: Interview conducted on 18 December 2014.

OTI, USAID Deputy Director 2007-2010: Interview conducted on 19 February 2015.

(Author) 1. What was the Civil Affairs mission and primary role in your undergoverned territories?

(CMSE-Sri Lanka) The primary mission was to support SOCPAC, interagency, and HN partners IOT identify, mitigate and/or reduce civil vulnerabilities caused by instability, especially due to violent extremist organizations. This as the primary CMSE mission. SOCPAC, USPACOM and the US Ambassador to Sri Lanka sought to gain visibility in areas of Sri Lanka that had been previously occupied by the LTTE and work with the Sri Lankan government and military forces to engage the civilian populace, identify critical vulnerabilities and promote stability in line with U.S. strategic interests.

The U.S. Ambassador did not want to introduce a SOF presence into Sri Lanka. As a result, she only allowed Civil Affairs to work in Sri Lanka because of our ability to conduct Humanitarian Assistance missions. Therefore, the CMSE element became dual hatted as the PACOM Augmentation Team lead (note by interviewer: PAT team is synonymous with Military Liaison Element). The secondary mission was to perform the functions, to the best of my ability, of the PAT team leader and expand SOF presence in country.

(CMSE-Pakistan) There were two main time frames for my deployment. First, in 2007 Pakistan was established as a SOCCENT priority country. The specific Area of Interest was the FATA regions along the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The primary CA mission was to gain access to those isolated regions, identify the networks that were causing the VEOs to flourish in those areas, and conduct a FID mission with the Frontier Corps. The FID mission was specifically to enhance the capability of the government in the FATA regions and increase the Pakistan presence in those regions.

In 2009, SOCCENT realized that the long term emplacement into those border regions were lacking. The Civil Affairs teams were very successful at gaining access into those regions, but gave little thought to DoS synchronization. I redeployed to Pakistan and worked in the Embassy. There were other teams that worked for me in the border region, but I worked to ensure that our programs were synchronized with the DoS programs in place. I worked out of the ODRP office which is similar to the ODC.

Civil Affairs had the most access throughout Pakistan, and this made our actions very popular in Pakistan. However, we lacked the mechanisms to implement programs quickly. We had funds, but OTI/DoS had the ability to create larger programs. We then began to work closely with the OTI with the intent of gaining maintaining long term emplacement in the regions we wanted access to. An example of this was a wheat drive. We were able to purchase the wheat through OTI and then used it to gain access to ungoverned territories that were previously isolated from DoS or HN presence.

(SOCFWD-Pakistan CDR) The Civil Affairs teams in Pakistan did everything I asked of them and were extremely successful, especially at conducting FID in the border regions. However, instead of talking about what they did, which you can get from the CA teams, I want to talk about what my expectations were. This is what I believe all SOF CDRs who are working in a Title 22 area, trying to stop VEO growth are looking for. The first thing that I want a team to be able to do is to gain and maintain access into a specific NAI. Obviously in Pakistan working with the Frontier Corps and OTI was very successful. However, I want a team to think creatively and work with any NGO, HN program or paramilitary group in order to gain access into an area.

Next, I want the team to be able to build the Civil Information picture. This includes both the Human network and the physical infrastructure. I want to know the leaders, motivations, population centres in those areas. A Civil Affairs team has access and should capitalize on it. They should be able to spot and assess leaders, assets, or other opportunities that can be utilized by the other members of the SOF enterprise.

Once the team has access, they should seek to teach governance/conduct FID to expand the State department presence in the NAIs. This is typically the means of success and the counter narrative. The CA team should always be looking for ways to expand the SOF mission. Whether this means brining in PO, SOF or intel assets, CA teams should focus on capitalizing on their access.

Finally, the CA team must be able to utilize the access they gained in one region to expand into the next region. The relationships, and networks they develop should be able to reach into the neighbouring regions. The CA team acts as a Recon asset and brings SOF, DoS and HN into the region. Then they move into the neighbouring regions and do the same thing. In this manner, they consistently expand the presence of the government into these isolated regions.

(USAID/OTI Pakistan) Initially we were not sure what the CA mission was. We knew they were related to SF and were working with them, but nobody really told us what they were doing. Our office in the embassy had a lot of contacts everywhere in the country but we did not have a lot of unprogrammed money and we did not leave the capital very often. The Civil Affairs group had the most access throughout Pakistan but I don't think they really knew what they were doing. They started doing projects and buying products

but didn't have any of the systems in place to get it to the right people. They came over to us and talked to us a bit about what they were doing and we began to work with them. Initially we just sold them products but as we got comfortable with each other we started working together more.

So I guess their mission was to catch and kill insurgents. The CA guys focused on using development to create conditions for the Pakistani government to thrive. I agreed with them and thought it was a good approach, which is why we worked with them. The Ambassador did not like this concept and I think she said that you cannot mix defense and development. Of course the Secretary of State said that you could, and that may be why she let the CA guys stay. Towards the end of my time in Pakistan, the CA team became very embedded with the embassy and we helped shape and direct their programs. There was an aspect of their mission that I don't know a lot about but made me uneasy. Sometimes, the reasons for going into an area or the people that went with the CA guys was Intelligence. I fully support finding and catching bad people, but our development activities cannot appear to be supporting Intelligence otherwise none of our partners will work with us. The team never said they were doing this, but that was the vibe we got.

(Author) 2. How did Civil Affairs assess the sources of vulnerabilities that led to the development of the ungoverned territories?

(CMSE-Sri Lanka) We worked by through and with interagency, non-governmental and host nation partners in order to gather information from various perspectives and then prioritized areas in which to conduct operations and examine conditions directly. Once we identified vulnerabilities and the drivers of instability (shortfalls in governance, resources or infrastructure), we determined gaps between the host nation government and the populations that led to grievances and support for non-state actors.

We did not have any specific tools provided to us. We largely used on the spot assessments and NGO/IA word of mouth to assist in understanding what the vulnerabilities and sources of instability were.

We indirectly benefited from using the frameworks provided by the IA and NGOs already working in Sri Lanka, and we utilized the USAID FOG manual to organize our assessments. A solid framework would have been much more effective to both provide us a framework to assess and to synchronize our activities with DoS.

(Authors Note: The team leader referred to a framework without naming which one specifically he used. The author asked specifically if he had used or heard of the Conflict Assessment Framework, the response was yes. He did not know of the framework before the mission but in a following assignment, he was introduced to it and stated it would have been extremely helpful to him.)

(CMSE-Pakistan) Security concerns hindered our ability to conduct assessments unilaterally. The majority of our assessments were done through the local leaders. We would provide them with the list of information requirements and then they would provide us with the required information. In order to verify the accuracy of the

information, we would cross check this information with the implementing partners of OTI and USAID. Once we had completed this initially, we were able to capitalize on the access provided by the Frontier Corps to conduct our own assessments.

The first deployment we used a lot of our own assessment tools. They varied and were mostly limited to asking what the locals thought were the problems. Later, as we became integrated with OTI, we used many of their assessment tools. This became helpful in gaining approval. Our programs were approved by both OTI and SOCFWD.

(Note: The tools utilized by the OTI in Pakistan were precursors to the Conflict Assessment Framework. They can be found on the USAID-Pakistan website.)

(USAID/OTI Pakistan) Like I said, initially it did not seem like they knew what they were doing. We assumed that they had their own Intelligence that said to go in certain areas. But we had a lot of the expertise and partners and if we worked together on it, we could have supported the same goals. The CA team would say they wanted to work in a certain area, but then had a hard time explaining why. At USAID, if we want to start or modify a program, there is usually a library of reports explaining why. When CA or I should say all Soldiers, give me a one-line explanation, it raises a lot of doubt.

(Authors Note: I asked her specifically if CA used any of their assessments in order to re-focus the interview.)

Yes. This was a turning point in my mind. We utilized what is now the Conflict Assessment framework. It poses a series of questions and allows us to analyse an area based on that. When we got the Civil Affairs soldiers to use it, it helped us answer some of our questions. They could go places we could not so we relied on them to complete our assessments. In addition, when they used our tools to explain what they were doing, it gave them more credibility. There are doctors and really smart people who developed those programs. Using that framework, I think there is a new version, will always provide credibility.

(Author) 3. What were the challenges to Civil Affairs supporting both DoS and DOD Objectives simultaneously?

(CMSE-Sri Lanka) We did not have a challenge supporting both SOF and DoS. This was because of the Command Directive from Admiral Pybus. With the PAT training course and his emphasis on supporting DoS objectives, it was easy to nest SOF and DoS objectives. We received a lot of training during PMT on how to do this, and we were provided tools that help synchronize SOF, DoS and USAID. (Note: Interviewer was provided a copy of this tool).

The biggest challenge that we faced was the fact that the Sri Lankan military, especially most of the Army was off limits to direct engagement due to Leahy Amendment considerations and allegations of human rights abuses. This restricted direct engagement and support of Army units and leaders but offered opportunities to use permitted

channels such as medical assistance, civil-military engagement, and humanitarian demining activities as a means of interaction.

(CMSE-Pakistan) The biggest challenge was in understanding the purpose of each others mission. The OTI mission was similar to ours, in that they sought to gain access to ungoverned areas. However, they often referred to DoD programs as “chasing a thousand points of life”. They wanted a more structured approach to program development. They were also restricted by policy until 2010, which limited their ability to get to those ungoverned areas.

In 2009, when I returned to work at the ODRP, my focus was on aligning our programs with OTI. OTI had just adapted their policy and gained new implementing partners. As a result, we were able to integrate our programs a lot better. The only challenge was in ensuring that the programs remained focused. This was so important that they added my position at the Embassy, just to synchronize SOCFWD positions with DoS and OTI.

(USAID/OTI Pakistan) Our missions were very identical so it was next to easy. The challenge was sitting down and rectifying the purpose behind the mission. Once we agreed on that, it was easy. When the CA Team Leader began working permanently at the embassy, it made it easy to understand each other’s mission.

(Author) 4. Was Civil Affairs capable of enabling the Department of State (DoS) mission?

(CMSE-Sri Lanka) Yes, definitely. DoS personnel were few in number and usually were not able to travel throughout the country as we could so we were able to provide information and feedback to policy communications between the Embassy and Washington.

Because our efforts were synchronized, we were able to deploy as an extension of DoS. Upon our return we were able to provide DoS information that in turn extended their influence in the ungoverned territories.

Enabling the DoS mission is all about building trust and relationships. When we collaborated with various NGOs or embassy offices, we would have to convince them of our ability to help in their mission. We did this by being transparent about our intentions, while providing them access into ungoverned territories. There were limitations with this as one time the USAID director accused us of spying during one of our missions to the north. However, these situations can be avoided through continuous demonstration of our intentions.

Longer deployments for the embassy teams would help build trust as the DoS offices would see that we are committed to long term solutions.

(CMSE-Pakistan) Yes, but there were some complications. Initially we were able to gain access for the OTI and this allowed them to build their programs. The OTI understood the SOF mission, but as long as we maintained synchronization, we enabled the OTI missions. Things changed when the new Ambassador arrived. The new

Ambassador was more focused because she believed that programs support development only. She felt that there was no way that a development program could support a SOF OBJ.

We were able to mitigate this through engagements and demonstrating our commitment. My permanent position on the ODRP enabled constant engagement. Basically I had to show her that we were not focused on killing bad guys or spying, but on enabling the Pakistan government to become more visible in those ungoverned areas.

The eventual outcome was we continued to gain access for OTI. We had the survival, and security training to do this and we had built the relationships at the local level to continue gaining access to new areas. We mitigated the concerns of the ambassador by developing a committee that ensured our programs were constantly synchronized with those of DoS. The DoS was in charge of these meetings, but along with OTI, we were the primary players. We shared our CIM with OTI and began using the DSF and TCAF as our assessment tools. This allowed our access to truly support their programs.

(USAID/OTI Pakistan) Absolutely. Like I said, there were large portions of the country that are blocked off and no DoS employee is allowed to go there. We work through our implementing partners but never get a U.S. perspective on the program. If CA works as a lead for DoS, that can be a great relationship. There was a period in 2007 or 2008 when the CA soldiers developed stand-alone programs and in those cases, they did not enable DoS or us. When we worked together and they were nested with our programs, then they essentially did the ground work for us. We built our MSRP programs off of their initial work.

(Author) 5. How did Civil Affairs gain access to an ungoverned area in order to analyse, segment, and map the human terrain? What methods were used to capture and analyze this information?

(CMSE-Sri Lanka) We worked with the experts on the ground such as interagency development experts, nongovernmental organizations and host nation civilian and military officials to gather information and then increasingly gain their trust and cooperation as we supported their initiatives while pursuing our own.

We captured data and sent reports back to our TCMSE and TSOC for further analysis and dissemination. While I am certain that the SOF Intelligence cells used and analysed this information, we did not have much visibility on that process or on what information gaps needed to be filled by them.

The information that we used was loaded into GIS for mapping. We did not use the same systems as either DoS or the SOF Intelligence cells. I don't think that was very important because I could still relay all the information to everyone who needed it. I learned later that other team leaders utilized Google maps and other systems that was used by the Embassy Information Managers. This helped them significantly so maybe having similar systems is a benefit. For me personally, I focused on getting information that was relevant to each group and that seemed to work for me.

Since this deployment I have served as a CMOC Chief and Company Commander and have gotten the opportunity to learn so much more. I have seen other frameworks that would have been very helpful. One example is the Conflict Assessment Framework. The problem is that I did not know about these frameworks so we had to use what was available.

(CMSE-Pakistan) In 2007, this was probably the most important aspect of my mission. The SOCFWD Commander told me what region he wanted to go to, and I began to conduct area studies and basic CR to identify a method to gain access. For example, we found out that a region lacked food. We purchased wheat through the OTI and requested permission to distribute it in the targeted region. Once there mapping the human terrain was easy.

When you show up with something the people need, everyone (good or bad) lines up to get some from you. When we did the wheat drive, as people came to grab food, we asked them a few questions, took beginn photos, and started piecing together who everyone was. Going back to the question, we used a variety of tools to analyse the information, but the bottom line, we gave the intelligence section information they needed and the DoS Information they needed. If the Intelligence section needed more information, they either let us know what they needed, or they came with us. We were normally able to focus on conducting CA tasks, and the information just naturally came to us.

(Author) 6. What were the limitations and capability gaps for Civil Affairs serving as the sole DOD representative in an ungoverned territory?

(CMSE-Sri Lanka) Limited personnel meant limited coverage of territory; even with split team operations, we could only cover so much ground.

We relied on the generosity of interagency, nongovernmental and host nation partners for administrative and logistical support; without this support we would not have been able to get anything done.

We depended on relationships rather than authorities, which resulted in more trust and a better working environment.

Better Intel training and support would have been beneficial. Specifically with how to synchronize better with the Intel community and with report writing.

Rather than the traditional force protection training, we could have used counterintelligence or counter surveillance training.

(CMSE-Pakistan) Some of the key things we learned from 2007 through 2009 was the CA teams on the ground had to subordinate to a CA team leader at the Embassy. This was vital. There were some many NAIs that we had to have multiple teams on the ground in the ungoverned areas, but they could not synchronize with DoS on their own. They had to have a presence at the Embassy to assist.

In this capacity, the CA guys need as much training as possible on how to think and plan strategically, as well as working as part of the DoS or ODRP staff. CA teams also need to maintain their survivability skills and their information collection abilities. We received some training in this but every team is out and isolated in NAIS. If they cannot gather the

right information, it becomes a waste of access. Their isolation also makes them vulnerable, and they must be able to secure themselves. There is a lot of required training, but those are both often overlooked areas.

(USAID/OTI Pakistan) I don't know a lot about their training and education. The only thing I could say is that they need to really understand the DoS and USAID programs. There are so many things we are already focused on and have partners working on. It would be too easy to latch on to one of those, but often the Army just wants to create their own program. I think they just need to be smarter on what everyone else is doing. We need to be smarter on what the Army is doing. It works both ways. But to answer the question, the CA soldiers just needed to be smarter on who we were and what we did.

APPENDIX E

CMAG AND MSG INTERVIEW RESPONSES

The following questions were asked by the researcher to the following Department Chiefs: (Note: to protect their confidentiality, this thesis utilizes the duty position instead of the name.)

CMAG Director 2012-2013: Interview conducted on 17 December 2014.

MSG Deputy Director 2013-Present: Interview conducted on 18 December 2014.

(Author) 1. What are some aspects of your program that will allow CA to support both DoS and DoD objectives simultaneously?

(CMAG) The CMAG provides support through Integrated country strategy development. It provides a broader lens. When information from the team is shared through the TSOC, the CMAG can assist in synchronizing their activities with DoS. It can also help with finding NGOs that are able to support the team's programs. The CMAG is located in the national Capital Region and therefore has access to the department heads and NGO main Offices. We can ID and interface with NGOs at the strategic level. This network can be mobilized if needed in support of the teams.

The best way to say it is that the CMAG provides greater visibility which equals a greater application of resources to the problem. Once organizations in the NCR know about the issue, more agencies are able to assist in solving the problems.

The teams on the ground are able to build short term relationships. If the CMAG can enhance those relationships, it will enable long term effectiveness. We can also assist in providing clarity on the SOF mission and translate the assessments and findings to DoS and the NGOs. (At this point I asked if he saw any value in shared assessments). I am not sure. Shared assessment tools may help the short term objectives or support cooperation at the local level, but the long term objectives do not always synchronize. I am not sure if you could articulate the SOF mission and the DoS mission at the strategic level using the same tools.

(MSG) Currently the focus is on developing the Reservists in the Civil Affairs regiment. The functional Specialist program has not always been capable of providing specialty advice. In this manner, the MSG is developing a capability to provide true governance

expertise to the Army. This program does not focus entirely on the supporting DoS, but allows CA soldiers to provide expertise long enough for DoS to access an isolated region.

(Author) 2. How can Civil Affairs utilize your programs to enable the DoS Mission?

(CMAG) There are a lot of ways we can do this. Some historical examples is with USAID/OTI. We were able to establish relationships with them in the NCR, and foster the DoS/SOF relationship. We have helped synchronize objectives at the Strategic level, and then provided operational or tactical level feedback to help the teams that are down range.

Several teams have accomplished this very successfully. The teams in Columbia have done a very good job of this over the past 7 years, and the teams supporting SOCPAC are usually very effective. In fact, the initial team that went into Sri Lanka did a great job. We use their mission as a template for new team leaders trying to get a grasp of the complexities in their mission.

The CMAG can serve as an information conduit as well. We can share unclassified information with the NGOs and facilitate integrated programs even before a deployment. For example, if a team is going to deploy to Pakistan or a similar country, we can begin the relationship building at D.C. We can mirror some of the operational DoS/DoD committees to ensure maximum integration for all programs.

Finally, we provide education for all CA teams on the DoS capabilities. We work with OFDA and can support the education needed to build a JHOC or other emergency facility.

(IMSG) Often times DoS is unable to gain/maintain access into a region because the security level is too high, or the level of governance is so low that there are no partners to work with. The CA team who gains access into those areas are largely generalists, and they lack the expertise to truly make a difference from a governance standpoint. They can identify the key leaders, build relationships, and identify the general source of instability. The ISMG will then be able to support that CA team by providing a specialist with expertise in whatever field was lacking. That expert will be able to provide an expertise bridge between the CA team and the DoS programs.

The CA team still has to ensure that their actions are synchronized with DoS. The expert is not there to nest goals or plan strategically. The expert is there to begin assessing and solving specific vulnerabilities in a society. They will also have the capability to teach governance to key leaders and individuals.

The important thing to remember is that these experts have the academic background and requirements that increase their value to DoS. When a Civil Affairs generalist provides feedback to DoS, their academic background is often called into question. In this case, the Civil Affairs team will have an expert to provide validity to their assessments.

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